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Abstract
In the binary online (or “causal”) channel coding model, a sender wishes to communicate a message to
a receiver by transmitting a codeword x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n bit by bit via a channel limited to at
most pn corruptions. The channel is “online” in the sense that at the ith step of communication the
channel decides whether to corrupt the ith bit or not based on its view so far, i.e., its decision depends
only on the transmitted bits (x1, . . . , xi). This is in contrast to the classical adversarial channel in which
the error is chosen by a channel that has a full knowledge on the sent codeword x.
In this work we study the capacity of binary online channels for two corruption models: the bit-flip
model in which the channel may flip at most pn of the bits of the transmitted codeword, and the erasure
model in which the channel may erase at most pn bits of the transmitted codeword. Specifically, for
both error models we give a full characterization of the capacity as a function of p.
The online channel (in both the bit-flip and erasure case) has seen a number of recent studies which
present both upper and lower bounds on its capacity. In this work, we present and analyze a coding
scheme that improves on the previously suggested lower bounds and matches the previously suggested
upper bounds thus implying a tight characterization.
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1 Introduction
Reliable communication over different types of channels has been extensively studied in electrical engineer-
ing and computer science. One frequently used communication channel model is the binary erasure channel,
in which a bit (a zero or one) is either transmitted intact or erased. Specifically, an erased bit is a visible
error, denoted by a special symbol Λ, which can be identified directly by a receiver. Another frequently
studied channel model is the binary bit-flip channel, where bits can be flipped to their complement.
There are two broad approaches to model (erasure or bit-flip) errors imposed by the binary channel.
Shannon’s approach is to model the channel as a stochastic process; Hamming’s approach is a combinatorial
approach to model the channel by an adversarial process that can erase or flip parts of the transmitted
codeword arbitrarily, subject only to a limit on the number of corrupted bits.
It is interesting to further classify the Hamming model for an adversarial binary channel in terms of the
adversary’s knowledge of the codeword. Some examples include the standard adversarial channel (also
referred to here as the omniscient adversary), e.g., [1–3], the causal (or online) adversary, e.g., [4–8], and
the oblivious adversary, e.g., [9–11]; from the strongest adversarial power to weakest. In one extreme,
the omniscient adversarial model (a.k.a. the classical adversarial model) assumes that the channel has
full knowledge of the entire codeword, and based on this knowledge, the channel can maliciously choose
the error pattern. In the other extreme, the oblivious adversarial model is a model in which the channel
is clueless about the codeword and generates errors in a manner that is independent of the codeword
being transmitted. The causal adversarial model is an intermediate model between the two extremes, in
which the channel decides whether to tamper with a particular bit of the codeword based only on the
bits transmitted so far. There are significant differences between the different adversarial models classified
above (with respect to their capacity). We elaborate on these differences shortly.
In this work we focus on causal adversaries, and study reliable communication over binary causal adversarial
erasure channels and binary causal adversarial bit-flip channels. Specifically, we consider the following
communication scenario. A sender (Alice) wishes to transmit a message m ∈ U to a receiver (Bob) over a
binary causal adversarial channel by encoding m into a codeword x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n of length
n. However, the channel is governed by a causal adversary (Calvin), who can observe x and manipulate
up to a p-fraction of the n transmitted bits. More importantly, Calvin decides whether to tamper with the
i-th bit of the codeword based only on the bits (x1, x2, · · · , xi) transmitted thus far. Our goal is to find a
coding scheme by which Alice can send as many distinct messages as possible while ensuring Bob succeeds
in decoding w.h.p. Roughly, if 2nR distinct messages can be sent using codewords of length n, we say that
a code achieves rate R. We are interested in the maximum achievable rate R, which is the capacity Cp of
the channel. (See Section 2 for precise definitions.)
1.1 Our Results
In this work we characterize the capacity of both the binary causal bit-flip channel and the binary causal
erasure channel as a function of p (the strength of the adversary). Specifically, we propose and analyze
a novel coding scheme which implies a lower bound on the capacity for both channels that matches the
known upper bounds [7,8] (to be described in detail shortly). Our main results can be summarized by the
following two Theorems.
Theorem 1.1. Let α (p, p¯) , 1− 4(p− p¯). The capacity of the binary causal adversary bit-flip channel is
Cflipp =
{
minp¯∈[0,p]
[
α (p, p¯)
(
1−H
(
p¯
α(p,p¯)
))]
, p ∈ [0, 1/4]
0, p ≥ 1/4
(1)
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Theorem 1.2. The capacity of the binary causal adversary erasure channel is
Cerasep =
{
1− 2p, p ∈ [0, 1/2]
0, p ≥ 1/2 (2)
In fact, as direct by-products of the analysis of our coding scheme, we can show that even if Calvin has
“small” lookahead, the capacity is essentially unchanged. More precisely, if for any constant  > 0, Calvin
decides whether to tamper with the i-th bit of the codeword based only on the bits (x1, x2, · · · , xj), where
j = min{n, i + n}, then the capacity of the corresponding “n-lookahead is at most f() less than the
corresponding Cflip and Cerase we show in Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 above (for some continuous f). We
provide a rough argument in support of this claim in the Remark at the end of Section 3.
1.2 Previous Work
We start by briefly summarizing the state-of-the-art for erasure and bit-flip adversarial channels, for both
omniscient and oblivious adversaries. The optimal rate of communication over binary omniscient adversar-
ial channels (for both erasure and bit-flip errors) are long standing open problems in coding theory. The
best known lower bounds for the problems derive from the Gilbert-Varshamov codes (the GV bound) [1,2],
and the tightest upper bounds (the MRRW bounds) from the work by McEliece et al. [3].
The literature on Arbitrarily Varying Channels (AVCs, e.g., [9]) implies that the capacity of the binary
oblivious adversarial bit-flip channel is 1 − H(p), and that of oblivious adversarial erasure channels is
1 − p; these match the well-known capacities of the corresponding “random noise” channels with bits
flipped or erased Bernoulli(p), but are attainable even for noise patterns that can be chosen (up to an
overall constraint of a p-fraction corruptions) by an adversary with full knowledge of the codebook, but no
knowledge of the actually transmitted codeword.1 An alternate proof of the capacity of the binary oblivious
bit-flip channel was presented in [10] by Langberg, and a computationally efficient scheme achieving this
rate was presented in [11] by Guruswami and Smith.
We now turn to the causal setting. As a causal adversary can never do better than an omniscient adversary
and does at least as well as an oblivious one, the upper bounds on capacity for oblivious adversaries specified
above act as upper bounds for the causal case as well; and the lower bounds on capacity for omniscient
adversaries act as lower bounds for the causal case. For the binary causal adversarial bit-flip channel
both bounds were improved. Specifically, the first nontrivial upper bound min {1−H(p), (1− 4p)+} was
given by Langberg et al. [5], and later, the tightest upper bound was given by the continuing work of
Dey et al. [7, 12] and is equal to Cflipp of Theorem 1.1. The best lower bound was described by Haviv
and Langberg [6] which slightly improves over the GV bound. For the binary causal adversarial erasure
channel the trivial upper bound of 1− p was improved to 1− 2p (which we demonstrate equals Cerasep in
Theorem 1.2) by Bassily and Smith [8] who also present improved lower bounds that separate the achievable
rate for causal adversarial erasures from the rates achievable for omniscient adversarial erasures.
Related results include the study of binary delayed adversaries by Dey et al. [13] who provide a character-
ization of the capacity in the case of “delays” d which are an arbitrarily small (but constant) fraction of
the code block length n.2 The value d here corresponds to an adversarial model in which the decision of
1In fact, it can even be shown that if Alice is allowed to use stochastic encoding – choosing one of multiple possible codewords
randomly for each message she wants to transmit – then even for a maximal probability of error metric, a vanishingly small
probability of error can be attained by capacity achieving codes. That is, there exists a sequence of codes whose rates
asymptotically achieve the corresponding capacity, and such that for every message transmitted by Alice and for every
corruption pattern imposed by Calvin, can be decoded correctly by Bob for “most” codewords corresponding to that message.
2While not presented in that work, the techniques of [13] can be used to show that the same capacity holds even if the
delay is polylog(n) rather than d = O(n).
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Figure 1: Bounds on the capacity of binary adversarial channels
whether or not to corrupt the ith codeword bit depends only on (x1, . . . , xi−d) (and the overall constraint
on the number of bits that can be corrupted). It is interesting to note that, in this case as well as the
oblivious one, the capacity of the bit-flip and bit-erasure channels matches the corresponding random noise
capacities (of 1−H(p) and 1− p). On the other hand, as mentioned, the causal and n lookahead settings
have strictly lower, but approximately matching, capacities. This seems to imply that the knowledge of
the present is critical for Calvin to significantly depress the capacity below the random noise capacity.
While the above discussion relates to the problem of binary alphabets, the work of Dey et al. [4] considered
“large alphabet channels” (in which the alphabet size is “significantly larger” than the block-length n)
with causal symbol errors.3 A complete capacity characterization was presented (with corresponding
computationally efficient codes attaining capacity), which demonstrated that the capacity of this problem
equals 1 − 2p, which is the same as the capacity of an omniscient adversary (attained by Reed-Solomon
codes, and impossibility of higher rates by the Singleton bound). This demonstrates that the penalty
imposed by the causality condition on Calvin diminishes with increasing alphabet size.
Also related to this work is the study of Mazumdar [14] in which the capacity of memoryless channels where
the adversary makes his decisions based only on the value of the currently transmitted bit is addressed.
We note that the causal model is also a variant of the AVC model [9,15], however previous works on AVCs
with capacity characterizations do not relate directly to the study at hand on causal adversaries.
3The capacity of large alphabet causal symbol erasures is essentially the same as that of omniscient large alphabet symbol
erasures, which in turn equals the capacity of random symbol erasures. Such rates can be directly attained by Reed-Solomon
codes, and matching converses obtained by Calvin merely randomly erasing pn symbols.
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1.3 Proof Technique
In this work we presents a coding scheme for both binary causal adversarial bit-flip and erasure channels
that achieves rates that match the known upper bounds (respectively [7,12] and [8]) from previous studies,
and as such is optimal. Our coding scheme is an existential one, and is based on stochastic encoders.
Specifically, in our codes the encoder Alice uses internal randomness (not known to the receiver Bob or
the adversary Calvin) in the choice of the transmitted codeword. The internal randomness is designed to
allow a high probability of successful communication no matter which message Alice is sending to Bob.
In both the erasure and bit-flip channels, the codes we use are random codes. Namely, we pick our codes
uniformly at random from all possible codes of a specific rate, and prove using probabilistic tools, e.g., [16],
that w.h.p. over the code distribution a code chosen at random allows reliable communication over our
channels. The decoder used in both the erasure and bit-flip case involves two major phases: a list decoding
phase in which the decoder obtains a short list of messages that includes the one transmitted; and a unique
decoding phase in which the list is reduced to a single message. Roughly, Bob in his decoding process
divides the received word into two parts – all bits received up to a given time t?, and all bits received
afterwards. The list decoding is done using the first part of the received word, and the process of unique
decoding from the list is done using the second part. Both the list decoding and the unique decoding phase
are done by considering the family of codewords of a certain given distance from the (first or second part
of the) received word.
In the erasure case, given the parameter p (that specifies the fraction of bits that can be erased by the
adversary) and the received word, the decoder Bob can pin-point the value of t? that will allow successful
decoding. Specifically, for any adversarial behavior, we show the existence of a value t? that satisfies two
special properties: the list decoding condition that allows Bob to obtain a small list of messages from the
first part of the received word; and the energy bounding condition which guarantees that the fraction of
bits erased by the adversary in the second part of the received word cannot suffice to confuse Bob between
any two messages in the list he holds. The ability to list decode is obtained using standard probabilistic
arguments that take into account the block length t? and the fraction of erasures pt? in the first part of
the received word. The ability to uniquely decode from the obtained list involves a more delicate analysis
which uses the stochastic nature of our encoding and the causality constraint of Calvin. In particular,
we use the fact that the secret bits used in the encoding of the first part of the codeword (up to position
t?) are independent of those used for the second part. This independence is useful in separating the two
decoding phases in the sense that the casual adversary at time t? is acting with no knowledge whatsoever
on the secret bits used by Alice after time t?. This lack of knowledge sets the stage for the unique decoding
phase.
We accommodate different potential values of t? by designing a stochastic encoding process in which
different parts of the codewords rely on independent secret bits of Alice. Namely, we divide the coding
process into chunks. Each chunk is a random stochastic code of length nθ for a small parameter θ that uses
independent randomness from Alice. The final code of Alice is a concatenation of all its chunks. Setting θ
small enough allows enough flexibility to manage any possible value t? chosen by Bob’s decoder.
The encoding and decoding process for the bit-flip channel follow the same line of analysis as specified
above for the erasure case, but with one major and significant difference. Bob does not know which bits in
the transmitted codeword were flipped, and thus by studying the received word, Bob is not able to identify
a location t? that satisfies the list decoding and energy bounding conditions. To overcome this difficulty, we
design an iterative decoding process in which Bob starts with a small value of t and performs an attempt
to decode. As before the decoding process first list decodes using the first part of the received word and
then uniquely decodes. The list decoding is done according to a certain “guessed” value pˆt for the fraction
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of bit flips in the first part of the received word. Here, pˆt is a carefully designed function of t (also referred
to as a “trajectory”) that is fixed and known to all parties involved in the communication. We show that
if Bob guessed correctly, i.e., if the fraction pˆt is equal to the actual fraction of bits pt flipped in the first
part of the received word, then the decoding will successfully return the correct message. Otherwise, we
show that the unique decoding phase will fail in the sense that Bob will not receive any message from the
decoding process. Identifying a failure in the decoding process, Bob increases t and repeats the decoding
attempt. The crux of our analysis lies in our proof that eventually, no matter what the behavior of Calvin
is, there will be a value of t, denoted t?, for which pˆt? is approximately pt? and the decoding succeeds.
Establishing the existence of the trajectory pˆt, and proving that at some point it must be close to pt is a
central part of our proof.
1.4 Structure
In the remaining part of this extended abstract we focus on our proof for the bit-flip case, i.e., Theorem 1.1,
as it includes the ideas needed for the simpler proof of Theorem 1.2. The proof of Theorem 1.2 appears in a
self contained manner in Appendix B. In Section 2 we formally present the channel model, the encoder, and
the decoding process. In addition, we present a careful description of the adversarial behavior. Section 3
then presents an overview of our code analysis and the proof of Theorem 1.1 (our main result for the bit-flip
channel). Due to space limitations, all the technical claims for the bit-flip channel and their proof appear
in the Appendix A.
2 Model
Channel Model: For any positive integer i, let [i] denote the set {1, 2, · · · , i}. For a transmission
duration of n bits, a binary causal adversarial bit-flip channel can be characterized by a parameter p ∈ [0, 1]
and a triple (X n,Adv,Yn). Here, p is the fraction of bits that Calvin can flip in a codeword, X = {0, 1}
and Y = {0, 1} are the input and output alphabet of the channel, and Adv = {Advi|i ∈ [n]} is a sequence
of mappings that represents the adversarial behavior in each time step. More precisely, each map Advi :
X i × Y i−1 → Y is a function that, at the time of transmitting the i-th bit, maps the sequence of channel
inputs up to time i, (x1, x2, · · · , xi) ∈ X i, together with the sequence of all previous channel outputs up
to time i− 1, (y1, y2, · · · , yi−1) ∈ Y i−1, to an output symbol yi ∈ Y. The functions Advi must satisfy the
adversarial power constraint, namely that at no point in time does the total number of bit-flips exceed pn.
Random code distribution: We now define a distribution over codes. In our proof, we use this
distribution to claim the existence of a fixed code that allows reliable communication between Alice and
Bob over the channel model. In our code construction R denotes the code rate, S the private secret rate
of the encoder (to be defined explicitly shortly), and θ a “quantization” parameter (specified below).
Let U = [2nR] denote Alice’s message set and S = [2nS ] be the set of private random secrets available only
to Alice. The encoder randomness S is neither shared with the receiver nor the adversary. Let Φ be the
uniform distribution over stochastic codes U ×S → X nθ. Let C1, C2, · · · , C 1
θ
be stochastic codes, which are
i.i.d. according to the probability distribution Φ. Specifically, ∀i ∈ [1θ ], the corresponding stochastic code
is a map Ci : U × S → X nθ chosen from the distribution Φ.
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Encoder: Given a message m ∈ U and 1θ secrets, s1, s2, · · · , s 1θ each in S, a codeword of length n with
respect to the message m and the 1θ secrets is defined to be the concatenation of
1
θ chunks of sub-codewords,
C1 (m, s1) ◦ C2 (m, s2) ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
(3)
where Ci(m, si) is the i-th sub-codeword in the entire codeword, and ◦ denotes the concatenation between
two chunks of sub-codewords. To distinguish the concatenated code C from the code for a chunk, we will
call C1, C2, · · · , C 1
θ
sub-codes hereafter. Our analysis then focuses on two mega sub-codes, defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. Let a code C of block-length n consist of 1θ sub-codes, i.e., C = C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1θ . LetT = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ} and t ∈ T . A left mega sub-code of C with respect to t is the concatenation of
the first tnθ sub-codes of C.
Definition 2.2. Let a code C of block-length n consist of 1θ sub-codes, i.e., C = C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1θ . LetT = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ} and t ∈ T . A right mega sub-code of C with respect to t is the concatenation of
the last 1θ − tnθ sub-codes of C.
In our analysis, it is convenient to describe the encoding scheme of Alice in a causal manner. Namely, we
will assume that the secret value si corresponding to the encoding of the i-th chunk is chosen by Alice
immediately before the i-th chunk is to be transmitted and no sooner.
As mentioned above, we show that with positive probability, the code C chosen at random based on the
distribution above has certain properties that allow reliable communication over our channel model.
Decoding process: The decoding process of Bob is done in an iterative manner. Specifically, upon
receiving the entire codeword with bit-flips, Bob identifies the smallest value of t ≥ (1−4p)n corresponding
to the (end) location of a chunk, and attempts to correctly decode the transmitted message m based on
the left and right mega sub-codeword with respect to position t. The decoding process is terminated if a
message is decoded by Bob, otherwise the value of t is increased by θn (the chunk size) and Bob attempts
to decode again. This process continues until t reaches the end of the codeword. If no decodings succeeds
until then, a decoder error is declared.
Each attempt of decoding can be divided into two phases. First, at each position t, Bob chooses an estimate
pˆt (to be specified shortly) for the fraction of bit-flips used by Calvin in the left mega sub-codeword with
respect to position t. In our proof to come, we show that pˆt satisfies two important conditions, the list-
decoding condition and the energy bounding condition (see Claim A.6). The list-decoding condition allows
Bob to decode the left mega sub-codeword C1 (m, s1) ◦ C2 (m, s2) ◦ · · · ◦ C t
nθ
(
m, s t
nθ
)
through a list decoder
with list size L. As we will show, the list size L consists of at most O
(
1

)
messages. Here, and in what
follows, ε > 0 is a constant design parameter that can be considered to be arbitrarily small. So at this
phase Bob obtains a list L of L messages. If it is the case that pˆt equals the true fraction of bits pt flipped
by the adversary up to position t, then it holds that the transmitted message is in L.
Next, for the second phase, the energy bounding condition states that, if pˆt equals pt, there are no more
than
(
1
4 − 
2
16
)
(n− t) bits flipped in the right mega sub-codeword with respect to position t. Therefore, as
we will show, Bob can use a natural consistency decoder (defined below) to determine whether to stop or
continue the decoding process. More precisely, the decoding process continues if the consistency decoder
fails to return a message and stops if a message mˆ is decoded from the messages in L. The decoder also
stops when t has reached size n− nθ.
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Definition 2.3. Let ε > 0. Let xt,x
′
t ∈ X n−t be two right mega sub-words with respect to position t.
The right mega sub-word xt is consistent with the right mega sub-word x
′
t if and only if the number of the
positions that xt does not agree with x
′
t is no more than
(
1
4 − 
2
16
)
(n− t).
Definition 2.4. A consistency decoder applied to a right mega sub-code C t
nθ
+1 ◦C t
nθ
+2 ◦· · ·◦C 1
θ
with respect
to position t and list L is a decoder that takes the right mega sub-word of a received word x′ and returns
a unique message mˆ in the list L, one of whose right mega sub-codewords is consistent with that of x′. If
more than one such message exists, then a decoding error is declared.
Formally, the decoder process of Bob can be described as follows. Essentially, we will use the following
definition of pˆt (the estimate to Calvin’s corruption fraction at time t used by Bob), which is slightly revised
later in Definition A.3 to be more robust to slight slacknesses that appear in the analysis. Let p ∈ (0, 14),
then for t < n(1 − 4p), pˆt = 0; otherwise pˆt = p −
(
1
4 − p
) (
n
t − 1
)
. The value of pˆt is 0 for all t up to
n(1 − 4p) and then it grows up to p as t increases to n. For the description below, recall that ε > 0 is a
constant design parameter that can be considered to be arbitrarily small.
1. Find the smallest integer k with t = knθ such that t ≥ n(1 − 4p). Namely, let k0 =
⌈
1−4p
θ
⌉
. Then
t = t0 = k0nθ.
2. List-decode the left mega sub-code C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ C t
nθ
to obtain a list L of messages of size L, with the
list-decoding radius tpˆt. More precisely, a message is in the list L if there is a codeword corresponding to
m for which its left mega sub-codeword is of distance no more than tpˆt from the corresponding left mega
sub-word of the received word.
3. Verify the right mega sub-codewords corresponding to messages in the list L through a consistency
decoder. Specifically, consider the Hamming balls with radius r = n−t2 − (n−t)
2
8 centered at the right mega
sub-codeword of each codeword corresponding to a message in the list L. If the corresponding right mega
sub-word of the received word is outside all the balls, increase t by nθ and goto Step (2). If the received
right mega sub-word lies in exactly one of the balls, decode to the message corresponding to the center of
the ball. If the received right mega sub-word lies in more than one ball a decoding error is declared.
For every message m, Bob decodes correctly if his estimate mˆ equals m. That is, Bob decodes correctly
if for some t?, the only right mega sub-codeword of the codewords corresponding to messages in the list
L consistent with that of the received codeword corresponds to the message m. We show that this indeed
happens w.h.p. over the random secrets Sn−t used by Alice for the right mega sub-codeword with respect
to position t?. If Bob’s estimate mˆ is not equal to m, Bob is said to make a decoding error. The probability
of error for a message m is defined as the probability over Alice’s private secrets s ∈ S that Bob decodes
incorrectly. The probability of error for the code C is defined as the maximum of the probability of error
for message m over all messages m ∈ U .
A rate R is said to be achievable if for every ξ > 0, β > 0 and every sufficiently large n there exists a code
of block length n that allows Alice to communicate 2n(R−β) distinct messages to Bob with probability of
error at most ξ. The supremum over n of all achievable rates is the capacity Cp of the channel.
Adversarial behavior: The behavior of Calvin is specified by the channel model above. Specifically,
the behavior of Calvin can be characterized by a function pt defined below which specifies how many errors
were ejected by Calvin up-to position t. We refer to pt as a trajectory, and note that the exact trajectory
used by Calvin is not known to the decoder Bob.
Definition 2.5 (Calvin’s Trajectory pt). Let a codeword of length n consist of
1
θ chunks of sub-codewords.
Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ} and t ∈ T . Then pt is the actual portion of bit-flips that occurred in the
left mega sub-codeword with respect to t.
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In our analysis we assume that Calvin has certain capabilities that may be beyond those available to a
causal adversary. This is without loss of generality as we are studying lower bounds on the achievable rate
in this work. We assume that the trajectory of pˆt that Bob uses in his decoding process is known to Calvin.
This implies (as we will show) that Calvin knows the position t? that Bob eventually stops his decoding
process. In addition, we assume that the list of messages obtained through Bob’s list decoding process can
be determined explicitly by Calvin. Moreover, we assume that Calvin knows the message m a priori.
At every list-decoding position t, we stress that the subsequent secrets, namely, (s t
nθ
+1, s t
nθ
+2, · · · , s 1
θ
) for
the right mega sub-codeword are unknown to Calvin. Indeed, given the causal nature of Alice’s encoding,
these secrets have not even been chosen by Alice at this point in time. The fact that the secrets are hidden
from Calvin implies that (s t
nθ
+1, s t
nθ
+2, · · · , s 1
θ
) are completely independent of the list (obtained through
Bob’s list decoding) L determined by Calvin. This fact is crucial to our analysis.
Also, we strengthen Calvin by allowing him to choose which bits to flip after position t? non-causally.
Namely, we assume that Calvin chooses his bit-flip pattern after looking ahead to all the remaining bits
of the transmitted codeword. As we show, no matter how these bit-flips are chosen, the right mega sub-
codeword has at most
(
1
4 − 
2
16
)
(n− t?) bits flipped. The fact that the distribution of (s t?
nθ
+1
, s t?
nθ
+2
, · · · , s 1
θ
)
is independent from the list L will allow us to show that Bob succeeds in his decoding.
3 Code Analysis for the bit-flip Channel
Due to space limitations, the technical details of our proof appear entirely in the Appendix. In what
follows, we give a roadmap for our proof, including the major high-level arguments used in the Appendix.
Throughout, ε > 0 is a constant design parameter that can be considered to be arbitrarily small.
Existence of trajectory pˆt: Our analysis of Bob’s decoding begins with selecting a decoding reference
trajectory pˆt (Definition A.3) as a proxy trajectory for Calvin’s trajectory pt. Recall that for each t, pt
is the fraction of bit-flips in the left mega sub-codeword with respect to position t, and accordingly, pˆt is
the fraction of bits that Bob assumes are flipped up to position t. In general, the trajectories pˆt and pt
are not equal. We show in Claim A.6, that for t ≥ n(1− 4p) the selected decoding reference trajectory pˆt
satisfies two important conditions, the list-decoding condition (12) and the energy bounding condition (13)
introduced and explained previously. The list decoding condition guarantees a small list size if decoding is
done with radius pˆt; and the energy bounding condition restricts the remaining bit-flips that the adversary
has for the right mega sub-codeword if Bob’s estimate pt to pˆt is approximately correct.
To prove correctness of our decoding procedure, we must introduce a new trajectory p˜t and an additional
parameter p′ before we continue. These additional parameters are closely related to their counterparts in
the sense that p˜t approximately equals pˆt and p approximately equals p
′, but in both cases the former is
slightly smaller than the latter. The parameters are introduced to allow robustness in our analysis which
absorbs certain slacknesses that are a result of our code construction and analysis technique (e.g., such as
the fact that our chunk size nθ cannot be made too small). We here give our precise definitions, which
can be at times better understood intuitively if the reader keeps the above discussion in mind. All our
notations are given in Table 1.
Existence of position t? for which pˆt? ' pt?: Next in our analysis we chooses the position t0 =⌈
1−4p′
θ
⌉
nθ ' n(1 − 4p) as a benchmarking position, and separate our analysis into two cases based on
whether pt0 is greater than p˜t0 (See Definition A.9) or not. We use the following classification:
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Definition 3.1 (High Type Trajectory). For any trajectory pt of Calvin, consider the values of pt and p˜t
at position t = t0. If pt0 ≥ p˜t0 then Calvin’s trajectory pt is a high type trajectory.
Definition 3.2 (Low Type Trajectory). For any trajectory pt of Calvin, consider the values of pt and p˜t
at position t = t0. If pt0 < p˜t0 then Calvin’s trajectory pt is a low type trajectory.
For any High Type Trajectory of Calvin, we show in Claim A.8 that pt always intersects with pˆt at some
point t after t0 no matter what bit-flip pattern is chosen by Calvin (i.e., at point t, Bob’s estimate pˆt is
equal to the actual amount of bit flips pt). Moreover, by Claim A.11 and Claim A.12, this implies a value
t? (the chunk end which falls immediately after the intersection point t above) for which it is guaranteed
that the remaining bit-flip power of Calvin is low in the sense that the fraction of bit-flips that Calvin can
introduce in the right mega sub-codeword with respect to t? is less than 14 − 
2
16 . On the other hand, for
any Low Type Trajectory of Calvin, we already know that pt is approximately pˆt at the point t0 (they are
both nearly 0). Thus we show in Claim A.14 that setting t? to be equal to t0 we are again guaranteed
that the remaining bit-flip power of Calvin is low in the sense that the fraction of bit-flips that Calvin can
introduce in the right mega sub-codeword with respect to t? is less than 14 − 
2
16 . Formally:
Definition 3.3. Let ε > 0. Let p′ ∈ (0, 14) and θ = 2(1−4p′)4 . Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ} and t ∈ T .
(i) if pt0 < p˜0, t
? = t0 =
⌈
1−4p′
θ
⌉
nθ.
(ii) if pt0 ≥ p˜0, t? is the smallest value in T such that pt?−nθ > pˆt?−nθ and pt? ≤ pˆt?.
Success of Bob’s decoding: Bob starts decoding at position t0 and continues to decode at subsequent
chunk ends until a message is returned by the consistency decoder or until Bob reaches the end of the
received word. Claim A.15 and Corollary A.16 (via the list decoding condition (12)) guarantee that Bob in
his first phase of decoding will always obtain a list of messages of list size L = O
(
1

)
from the list decoder
no matter what position t is currently being considered. The analysis in Claim A.15 and Corollary A.16
and in the claims to come is w.h.p. over our random code construction. Moreover, for any t, the energy
bounding condition (13) implies that, in the case of pt ' pˆt, the unused bit-flips left for Calvin are less
than a 14 − 
2
16 fraction of the remaining part of the codeword.
We start by studying the case in which the current iteration of Bob satisfies t = t? (which implies that
pt ' pˆt). In Claim A.20, Claim A.21, and Claim A.23 we show that if t = t? Calvin’s remaining bit-flip
power is not sufficient to mislead the consistency decoder, and will allow unique decoding from the list of
messages Bob holds. Namely, we show that with high probability over the secret random bits of Alice used
in the encoding process, our code design guarantees that the only message in our list that is consistent
with the transmitted codeword is the one transmitted by Alice.
More precisely, consider the consistency checking phase of Bob in the iteration in which t = t?. In this
iteration we know (via the energy bounding condition (13)) that the number of unused bit-flips of Calvin
is less than a 14 − 
2
16 fraction of the remaining part of the codeword. At this point in time, Bob holds a
small list of messages L that has been (implicitly) determined by Calvin, and via the consistency decoder
wishes to find the unique message m in the list that was transmitted. For any transmitted message m, as
the list is small, we can guarantee that with high probability over our code design most of the right mega
sub-codewords corresponding to m are roughly of distance n−t2 from any right mega sub-codeword of any
other message in the list L, which in turn implies, given the bound on Calvin’s remaining bit-flips, that
decoding will succeed. However, this analysis is misleading as one must overcome the adversarial choice
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of L in establishing correct decoding. (We note that a naive use of the union bound does not suffice to
overcome all potential lists L.)
For successful decoding regardless of Calvin’s adversarial behavior, we use the randomness in Alice’s
stochastic encoding (not known a priori to Calvin) and the fact that Calvin is causal. Recall that every
message m can be encoded into several codewords based on the randomness of Alice. Let sleft and sright be
the collection of Alice’s random bits used up to and after position t? respectively. When Calvin (perhaps
partially) determines the list L we may assume that he has full knowledge of sleft. However by his causal
nature he has no knowledge regarding sright. As the list L is obtained at position t? by Bob, we may
now take advantage of the fact that it is independent of the randomness sright used by Alice. Specifically,
instead of considering a single codeword in our analysis that corresponds to m we consider the family of
codewords that on one hand all share a specific sleft (which corresponds to Calvin’s view up to position
t?) but have different sright. From Calvin’s perspective at position t
?, all codewords in this family are
equivalent and completely match his view so far. Using a family of codewords that are independent of L
in our analysis, and allowing the decoding to fail on a small fraction of them, enables us to amplify the
success rate of our decoding procedure to the extent that it can be used in the needed union bound. Our
full analysis is given in Claim A.20, Claim A.21, and Claim A.23.
We now address the case t 6= t? in Claim A.12. In this case, by previous discussions, it holds that we are in
a High Type Trajectory of Calvin and that pt > pˆt > p˜t. When t 6= t? we show that the decoding process
of Bob will not return any codewords at all (as all messages in the list will fail the consistency test). In
this case, we continue with the next value of t (the next chunk end).
We summarize all the properties of our code in Claim A.24. With those properties established, through
Bob’s iterative decoder we show in Claim A.26 that Bob is able to correctly decode the transmitted message
m w.h.p. over the randomness of Alice. Finally, in Theorem A.27 we show that the channel capacity Cp
claimed is indeed achievable. We depict the flow of our claims, corollaries and theorems in Figure 2.
Remark: The scenario wherein Calvin has n lookahead can also be handled via the codes above. Roughly,
if we back off in our rate by  the trajectory pˆt gets shifted to the left by n. We then “sacrifice” n bits
to Calvin by demanding that a more stringent energy-bounding condition be satisfied, in which the block
length of the second part (succeeding t?) is reduced by n. With these tweaks, the remainder of the analysis
of the n-lookahead codes is identical to that of the causal codes discussed above.
4 Conclusion
In this work we obtain the capacity Cflipp for the causal bit-flip adversarial channel and Cerasep for the
causal erasure adversarial channel. We believe that for arbitrary q > 2, capacities of the q-ary causal
adversarial symbol error and erasure channels can be derived. Specifically, the outer bounds for the q-ary
problems follow from using the q-ary Plotkin bound [17] replacing the binary Plotkin bound used in the
outer bound techniques of [7] and [8]. The achievability strategies in this paper for q = 2 get modified
by replacing binary list-decoding and energy-bounding conditions with q-ary versions, leading to codes
with rates achieving the outer bounds mentioned above for the q-ary problems. Due to lack of space we
do not present details in this abstract. Given the significant difference between the capacities of causal
adversaries (characterized in this work) and the n-delayed adversaries considered in [13] (with capacities
equaling the corresponding random coding capacities), one open question that we do not address in this
work is the question of characterizing the capacity of an adversary that is “nearly” causal, i.e., a delay of
say some constant number of bits, or even just one bit. Another promising direction for future research is
whether the techniques of [11] to construct computationally efficient capacity-achieving codes for oblivious
adversaries can be modified to construct corresponding capacity-achieving codes for causal adversaries.
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Appendices
A Bit-flip channel
We start by summarizing several definitions and claims. The detailed presentations of the definitions and
claims are followed by the summary.
1. Preliminary definitions and technical claims
• Definition A.1: Defines p¯t for deriving the definition of the decoding reference trajectory pˆt.
• Definition A.3: Defines the decoding reference trajectory pˆt, which is a revision of the definition
given in Section 2.
• Lemma A.5: A technical lemma which gives a certain upper bound on the binary entropy
function.
2. The list decoding and energy bounding properties
• Claim A.6: This is a central claim which shows that the decoding reference trajectory pˆt satisfies
the list-decoding condition and the energy bounding condition.
3. Establishing the existence of correct decoding point
• Claim A.8: Calvin’s trajectory pt intersects with the decoding reference trajectory pˆt no later
than the second to last chunk.
• Definition A.9: Defines the energy bounding benchmarking trajectory p˜t, which delimit the
smallest value of pt that meets with the energy bounding condition.
• Claim A.11: For any High Type Trajectory pt, the value of pt at the chunk end immediately
after the intersection of the decoding reference trajectory pˆt with pt satisfies the energy bounding
condition.
• Claim A.12: If pt is larger than p˜t at point t, then pt satisfies the energy bounding condition.
• Claim A.14: At point t0, if pt0 is approximately pˆt0 then it satisfies the energy bounding condi-
tion.
4. List decoding properties
• Claim A.15: A left mega sub-code can be list decoded to a list of messages of size O (1 ) with
high probability.
• Corollary A.16: Every left mega sub-code can be list decoded to a list of messages of size O (1 )
with high probability.
5. Utilizing the energy bounding condition
• Definition A.17: Defines the distance between a right mega sub-codeword and a list of right
mega sub-codewords.
• Definition A.18: Defines certain goodness properties of a right mega sub-code with respect to a
message, a list of right mega sub-codewords (of messages excluding the transmitted message),
and a sequence of secrets.
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Claim A.6
List-decoding condition and energy bounding condition
High Type Trajectory (𝑝𝑡0 ≥  𝑝𝑡0) Low Type Trajectory (𝑝𝑡0 <  𝑝𝑡0)
Claim A.12
𝑝𝑡∗ satisfies the energy bounding condition
Claim A.11
𝑝𝑡∗ is between  𝑝𝑡∗ and  𝑝𝑡∗
Claim A.8
Existence of intersection point of 𝑝𝑡 and  𝑝𝑡
Existence of correct decoding point 𝒕∗ Existence of correct decoding point 𝒕∗ = 𝒕𝟎
Claim A.14
𝑝𝑡0 satisfies the energy bounding condition
Lemma A.5
Bounding 𝐻(𝑥)
List decoding of message list size 𝐎
𝟏
𝝐
Claim A.15
List size for a left mega sub-code 
Corollary A.16
List size for every left mega sub-code
Existence of good right mega sub-code
Claim A.23
(w.h.p.) Every right mega sub-code is good w.r.t. every message, every list of right mega sub-codewords, and most sequences of secrets
Claim A.21
(w.h.p.) Good right mega sub-code w.r.t. a message, a list of right mega sub-codewords, and most sequences of secrets
Claim A.20
(w.h.p.) Good right mega sub-code w.r.t. a message, a list of right mega sub-codewords, and a particular sequence of secrets
Theorem A.27
Channel capacity
Claim A.24
Good properties of our code design
Claim A.26
Probability of decoding error
Figure 2: Organization of our claims, corollaries and theorems
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• Definition A.19: Defines σ-goodness property of a right mega sub-code with respect to a message,
a list of right mega sub-codewords (of messages excluding the transmitted message), and most
sequences of secrets.
• Claim A.20: A right mega sub-code is good with respect to a message, a list of right mega
sub-codewords (of messages excluding the transmitted message), and a sequence of secrets.
• Claim A.21: A right mega sub-code is σ-good with respect to a message and a list of right mega
sub-codewords (of messages excluding the transmitted message.)
• Claim A.23: A right mega sub-code is σ-good with respect to every transmitted message and
every list of right mega sub-codewords (of messages excluding the transmitted message).
6. Summary and proof of Theorem 1.1
• Claim A.24: With high probability our code C possesses the needed properties.
• Claim A.26: With high probability Bob succeeds in decoding.
• Theorem A.27: Rephrasing of Theorem 1.1 (channel capacity).
A.1 Preliminary definitions and technical claims
Throughout our analysis, Calvin can flip at most fraction p of the bits of the transmitted codeword. Let
p′ = p+ 
2
16 . The parameter p
′ is considered in several of the derivations to follow. We take  > 0 and θ > 0
to be small constants. All parameters and their relations appear in Table 1.
Definition A.1 (p¯t). Let p
′ ∈ (0, 14). Let a codeword of length n consist of 1θ chunks of sub-codewords.
Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ} and t ∈ T . Then p¯t is defined as
p¯t = p
′ − 1
4
+
t
4n
(4)
Remark A.2. For t ≥ n(1− 4p′) we have p¯t ≥ 0.
Definition A.3 (Decoding Reference Trajectory pˆt). Let  > 0 and p
′ ∈ (0, 14). Let α (p′, p¯t) = 1−4(p′−p¯t)
for p¯t ∈ [0, p′]. Then for t ∈ [n(1− 4p′), n], pˆt is defined as
pˆt =
p¯t
α (p′, p¯t)
+
2
16α2 (p′, p¯t)
(5)
For t < n(1− 4p′), pˆt = 0.
Remark A.4. From Definition A.1, for t ∈ [n(1− 4p′), n] we have p¯t ∈ [0, p′] and
α
(
p′, p¯t
)
= 1− 4(p′ − p¯t)
= 1− 4
(
p′ − p′ + 1
4
− t
4n
)
=
t
n
(6)
15
By substituting p¯t and α (p
′, p¯t) into (5), pˆt can be expressed as a function of t, i.e., for t ∈ [n(1− 4p′), n]
we have
pˆt =
p¯t
α (p′, p¯t)
+
2
16α2 (p′, p¯t)
=
np¯t
t
+
n22
16t2
=
n
t
(
p′ − 1
4
+
t
4n
)
+
n22
16t2
=
n22
16
· 1
t2
− n(1− 4p
′)
4
· 1
t
+
1
4
(7)
In Figure 3 we plot pˆt as a function of t for a particular choice of n, p
′ and .
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Figure 3: The decoding reference trajectory pˆt as a function of t when n = 40000, p
′ = 18 and  = 0.08.
Four possible trajectories of Calvin are shown in comparison: 1. Squander all the bit-flips at the beginning;
2. A typical trajectory of Calvin; 3. Reserve all the bit-flips for the end; 4. Uniformly distribute all bit-flips
to each chunk.
Lemma A.5. Let q ∈ [0, 12) and γ ∈ (0, 12). Then
H(q + γ) < H(q) + 2γ log
1
γ
Proof. To prove the lemma, we first show that
log(1− x) + 2x ≥ 0
16
for x ∈ [0, 12) and
log(1− x) + 2x < 0
for x ∈ (12 , 1].
Let f(x) = log(1 − x) + 2x where x ∈ [0, 1]. Then f ′(x) = 2 − 1(1−x) ln 2 . Solving f ′(x) = 0, we obtain
x = 1− 12 ln 2 < 12 . Then for x ∈
(
0, 1− 12 ln 2
)
, f ′(x) > 0 and for x ∈ (1− 12 ln 2 , 1), f ′(x) < 0.
Since f(0) = f
(
1
2
)
= 0, then for x ∈ [0, 12) we have log(1− x) + 2x ≥ 0, and therefore,
log
1
1− x ≤ 2x (8)
On the other hand, for x ∈ (12 , 1] we have log(1 − x) + 2x < f (12) = 0, and thus, replacing (1 − x) by x
we have for x ∈ [0, 12)
2(1− x) < log 1
x
(9)
Since the binary entropy function H(q) is concave, namely, the second derivative of H(q) is negative for
q ∈ (0, 1), then
H(q + γ)−H(q)
q + γ − q <
H(γ)−H(0)
γ − 0
Therefore, we have
H(q + γ)−H(q) < H(γ)−H(0)
= γ log
1
γ
+ (1− γ) log 1
1− γ
≤ γ log 1
γ
+ (1− γ)2γ (10)
< γ log
1
γ
+ γ log
1
γ
(11)
= 2γ log
1
γ
where (10) follows by (8) and (11) follows by (9).
A.2 The list decoding and energy bounding properties
Claim A.6. Let  > 0 and p′ ∈ (0, 14). Let Cp′ = minp¯∈[0,p′] [α (p′, p¯)(1−H ( p¯α(p′,p¯)))] and R = Cp′ − 
where α (p′, p¯) = 1−4(p′−p¯) and p¯ ∈ [0, p′]. Let a codeword of length n consist of 1θ chunks of sub-codewords
where θ = 
2(1−4p′)
4 . Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ}. Then ∀t ≥ n(1− 4p′) and t ∈ T there exists pˆt ∈ [0, 1]
such that
t (1−H(pˆt))− n
2
≥ nR (12)
and that
np′ − tpˆt + (n− t)
2
16
≤ n− t
4
(13)
17
Proof. From Remark A.4, for t ∈ [n(1− 4p′), n− nθ] we have α (p′, p¯t) = tn , and it follows that nα (p′, p¯t) =
t = knθ for some integer k. Substituting t = nα (p′, p¯t) into (12) and dividing both sides by n, we obtain
α
(
p′, p¯t
)
(1−H(pˆt))− 
2
≥ R (14)
Next, from Definition A.3, substituting (5) into the left hand side (LHS) of (14) we have
α
(
p′, p¯t
)(
1−H
(
p¯t
α (p′, p¯t)
+
2
16α2 (p′, p¯t)
))
− 
2
>α
(
p′, p¯t
)(
1−H
(
p¯t
α (p′, p¯t)
)
− 2
√
2
16α2 (p′, p¯t)
)
− 
2
(15)
=α
(
p′, p¯t
)(
1−H
(
p¯t
α (p′, p¯t)
)
− 
2α (p′, p¯t)
)
− 
2
=α
(
p′, p¯t
)(
1−H
(
p¯t
α (p′, p¯t)
))
− 
where (15) follows from a variant of Lemma A.5. More precisely, for γ < 116 note that γ log
1
γ <
√
γ, and
therefore, H(q + γ) < H(q) + 2
√
γ.
Let p¯0 be the optimum p¯ that minimizes the expression α (p
′, p¯)
(
1−H
(
p¯
α(p′,p¯)
))
, namely,
Cp′ = α
(
p′, p¯0
)(
1−H
(
p¯0
α (p′, p¯0)
))
then
α
(
p′, p¯t
)(
1−H
(
p¯t
α (p′, p¯t)
))
−  ≥ α (p′, p¯0)(1−H ( p¯0
α (p′, p¯0)
))
−  = R (16)
and thus,
α
(
p′, p¯t
)(
1−H
(
p¯t
α (p′, p¯t)
+
2
16α2 (p′, p¯t)
))
− 
2
≥ R (17)
Thus far we have satisfied condition (12) in our claim. To see condition (13), we substitute (5) into the
LHS of (13) and note that α (p′, p¯t) = tn we have
np′ − t
(
p¯t
α (p′, p¯t)
+
2
16α2 (p′, p¯t)
)
+
(n− t)2
16
= np′ − t
(
np¯t
t
+
n22
16t2
)
+
(n− t)2
16
= np′ − np¯t − n
22
16t
+
(n− t)2
16
< np′ − np¯t
= np′ − n
(
p′ − 1
4
+
t
4n
)
(18)
=
n− t
4
where (18) follows by substituting (4) into p¯t.
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Remark A.7. Condition (12) in Claim A.6 corresponds to the list-decodability of our code. We will refer
to it as the list-decoding condition. We refer to Condition (13) as the energy bounding condition as it
bounds the number of bit-flips left for the adversary to impose on the remaining codeword. In Figure 4,
the uppermost solid curve corresponds to the setting of pˆt for which the list-decoding condition is tight;
the lowermost solid curve corresponds to the setting of pˆt for which the energy bounding condition is tight.
Any curve between these two solid curves satisfies both the list-decoding condition and energy bounding
condition. As is shown in Figure 4, the decoding reference trajectory pˆt we selected is a bit above the
lowest solid curve.
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Figure 4: The region encompassed by the list-decoding and the energy bounding condition for the case
where n = 40000, p′ = 18 ,  = 0.08 and t ∈ [20000, 40000].
A.3 Establishing the existence of correct decoding point
First we show that pˆt must eventually be greater than pt.
Claim A.8. Let  > 0 and p′ ∈ (0, 14). Let a codeword of length n consist of 1θ chunks of sub-codeword
where θ = 
2(1−4p′)
4 . Then we have
pˆ(n−nθ)(n− nθ) ≥ np′ (19)
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Proof. From (4) we have p¯t = p
′ − 14 + t4n . Here we have t = n− nθ so
p¯n−nθ = p′ − 1
4
+
n− nθ
4n
= p′ − θ
4
(20)
From Remark A.4, we have α (p′, p¯t) = tn , and therefore, α
(
p′, p¯(n−nθ)
)
= n−nθn = 1− θ. Then
pˆ(n−nθ) =
p¯(n−nθ)
α
(
p′, p¯(n−nθ)
) + 2
16α2
(
p′, p¯(n−nθ)
)
=
p¯(n−nθ)
1− θ +
2
16 (1− θ)2
=
p′ − θ4
1− θ +
2
16 (1− θ)2 (21)
Hence, we have
pˆ(n−nθ)(n− nθ) = pˆ(n−nθ)(1− θ)n
=
(
p′ − θ
4
+
2
16 (1− θ)
)
n
> np′ − n
2
16
+
n2
16− 42 (22)
> np′ (23)
where (22) follows by θ = 
2(1−4p′)
4 <
2
4 .
Definition A.9 (Energy Bounding Benchmarking Trajectory p˜t). Let  > 0 and p
′ ∈ (0, 14). Let a
codeword of length n consist of 1θ chunks of sub-codewords. Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ} and t ∈ T . Let
α (p′, p¯t) = 1− 4(p′ − p¯t) for p¯t ∈ [0, p′]. Then for t ∈ [n(1− 4p′), n], p˜t is defined as
p˜t =
p¯t
α (p′, p¯t)
+
(n− t)2
16t
(24)
For t < n(1− 4p′), p˜t = 0.
Remark A.10. We plot p˜t in comparison with pˆt in Figure 5. As is shown in Figure 5, the difference between
p˜t and pˆt is very small, which is analyzed in Claim A.11.
Claim A.11. Let  > 0 and p′ ∈ (0, 14). Let a codeword of length n consist of 1θ chunks of sub-codeword
where θ = 
2(1−4p′)
4 . Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ}. Let t? ∈ T and t? ∈ [n(1− 4p′), n− nθ]. If pt?−nθ >
pˆt?−nθ and pt? ≤ pˆt?, then we have pt? > p˜t?.
Proof. Let t? = k?nθ where integer k? ∈
[
1−4p′
θ ,
1−θ
θ
]
. Since pt?−nθ > pˆt?−nθ, we have
pt? ≥ (t
? − nθ)pt?−nθ
t?
>
(t? − nθ)pˆt?−nθ
t?
=
(k?nθ − nθ)pˆt?−nθ
k?nθ
=
(k? − 1)pˆt?−nθ
k?
(25)
20
2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 4
x 104
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
t
pˆt
p˜t
Figure 5: The trajectory of p˜t in comparison with pˆt for n = 40000, p
′ = 18 ,  = 0.08 and t ∈ [20000, 40000].
From (7) we have pˆt? =
n22
16 · 1t?2 −
n(1−4p′)
4 · 1t? + 14 . Then the gap between pˆt? and k
?−1
k? pˆt?−nθ can be
determined to be
pˆt? − (k
? − 1)pˆt?−nθ
k?
=
n22
16(k?nθ)2
− n(1− 4p
′)
4(k?nθ)
+
1
4
− k
? − 1
k?
(
n22
16(k?nθ − nθ)2 −
n(1− 4p′)
4(k?nθ − nθ) +
1
4
)
=
2
16(k?θ)2
− 
2
16k?(k? − 1)θ2 +
1
4k?
<
2
16(k?θ)2
− 
2
16k?θ
+
1
4k?
(26)
<
2
16(k?θ)2
− 
2
16k?θ
+
θ
4(1− 4p′) (27)
<
2
16(k?θ)2
− 
2
16k?θ
+
2
16
(28)
where (26) follows by k?(k? − 1)θ2 < (k?θ)2 ≤ k?θ, (27) follows by k? ≥ 1−4p′θ , and (28) follows by
θ = 
2(1−4p′)
4 .
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From (5) and (24) we have pˆt? =
p¯t?
α(p′,p¯t? )
+ 
2
16α2(p′,p¯t? )
and p˜t? =
p¯t?
α(p′,p¯t? )
+ (n−t
?)2
16t? . Hence, we have
pˆt? − p˜t? = n
22
16(k?nθ)2
− (n− k
?nθ)2
16k?nθ
=
2
16(k?θ)2
− 
2
16k?θ
+
2
16
(29)
> pˆt? − (k
? − 1)pˆt?−nθ
k?
(30)
> pˆt? − pt? (31)
Thus, we have pt? > p˜t? .
Claim A.12. Let  > 0 and p′ ∈ (0, 14). Let a codeword of length n consist of 1θ chunks of sub-codewords.
Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ} and t ∈ T . Let ph be the portion of bit-flips in the right mega sub-codeword
with respect to position t. Then if pt > p˜t we have
ph <
1
4
− 
2
16
(32)
Proof. From Remark A.4 and Definition A.1, we have α (p′, p¯t) = tn and p¯t = p
′ − 14 + t4n . Then
p˜t =
p¯t
α (p′, p¯t)
+
(n− t)2
16t
=
np′
t
− n− t
4t
+
(n− t)2
16t
(33)
Since pt > p˜t we have
np′ − tpt + (n− t)
2
16
< np′ − tp˜t + (n− t)
2
16
=
n− t
4
(34)
and thus,
ph =
np′ − tpt
n− t <
1
4
− 
2
16
.
Remark A.13. It also follows by (34) that if pt < p˜t then ph >
1
4 − 
2
16 .
Claim A.14. Let  > 0 and p′ ∈ (0, 14). Let a codeword of length n consist of 1θ chunks of sub-codeword
where θ = 
2(1−4p′)
4 . Let k0 =
⌈
1−4p′
θ
⌉
and t0 = k0nθ. Let p = p
′ − 216 . Then ∀pt0 ∈ [0, p˜t0 ], we have
np− t0pt0 +
(n− t0)2
16
≤ n− t0
4
(35)
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Proof. Since 1−4p
′
θ ≤
⌈
1−4p′
θ
⌉
< 1−4p
′+θ
θ , we have (1− 4p′)n ≤ t0 < (1− 4p′ + θ)n.
np− t0pt0 +
(n− t0)2
16
≤ np+ (n− t0)
2
16
= n
(
p′ − 
2
16
)
+
(n− t0)2
16
(36)
= np′ − t0
2
16
≤ np′ − (1− 4p
′)n2
16
(37)
= np′ − nθ
4
(38)
=
n− (1− 4p′ + θ)n
4
<
n− t0
4
(39)
where (36) follows by substituting p = p′− 216 , (37) follows by t0 ≥ (1− 4p′)n, (38) follows by θ = 
2(1−4p′)
4
and (39) follows by t0 < (1− 4p′ + θ)n.
A.4 List decoding properties
Claim A.15. Let ∆ > 0 and S = θ
3
8 . Provided that t (1−H(pˆt))− n2 ≥ nR as in Claim A.6 and t = knθ,
with probability over code design at least 1− 2−∆, the code C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ Ck is list-decodable with radius tpˆt
and list size
L =
1 + ∆t
1−H (pˆt)− nRt − nStθ
Proof. The proof follows ideas in [18, Thm. 10.3], and is modified slightly to correspond to stochastic
codes. We stress that although the code is stochastic and each message corresponds to several codewords,
we analyze the number L of different messages with codewords that fall into a Hamming ball of limited
radius. The number of words of length t in the Hamming ball with radius re = tpˆt can be determined as
re∑
i=0
(
t
i
)
< 2tH(pˆt) (40)
The number of potential codewords in k = tnθ chunks is
(
2nθ
)k
= 2knθ = 2t. We study the number of
different messages corresponding to codewords that may lie in such a ball. Each message m corresponds
to 2tS/θ codewords of length t. Since the encoding of each message is independent of other messages, the
probability that there exists more than L messages with corresponding codewords of length t all of which
lie in the Hamming ball of radius re centered at a received word is at most
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(
2nR
L+ 1
)
·
(
2tS/θ
)L+1 ·(2tH(pˆt)
2t
)(L+1)
< 2(nR+
nS
θ )(L+1)
(
2tH(pˆt)
2t
)(L+1)
(41)
= 2(nR+
nS
θ )(L+1)2−t(1−H(pˆt))(L+1)
= 2−t(1−H(pˆt)−
nR
t
−nS
tθ )(L+1) (42)
Thus, the probability that the word of k = tnθ chunks received is list-decoded to a list of size greater than
L is at most
2t · 2−t((1−H(pˆt))−nRt −nStθ )(L+1) (43)
To quantify (43), we study
t− t
(
(1−H (pˆt))− nR
t
− nS
tθ
)
(L+ 1) < −∆ (44)
Notice that from (12) we have
1−H (pˆt)− nR
t
− nS
tθ
≥ n
2t
− nS
tθ
=
n
2t
− nθ
2
8t
(45)
> 0
Hence, solving (44) for L we have
L >
1 + ∆t
1−H (pˆt)− nRt − nStθ
− 1 (46)
Therefore, if L satisfies (46) the code C1◦C2◦· · ·◦Ck is L-list decodable with probability at least 1−2−∆.
Corollary A.16. Let ∆ = log
(
pn3
)
. Then with probability over code design at least 1 − 1pn , for any
t = knθ and k ∈
[
1−4p′
θ ,
1−θ
θ
]
such that t (1−H(pˆt))− n2 ≥ nR, the code C1 ◦C2 ◦ · · · ◦Ck is L-list decodable
with radius tpˆt and list size
L =
1 +
log(pn3)
t
1−H (pˆt)− nRt − nStθ
= O
(
1

)
(47)
Proof. By Claim A.15, with probability 1− 2− log(pn3) the code C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ Ck is L-list decodable with list
size L being
1 +
log(pn3)
t
1−H (pˆt)− nRt − nStθ
Therefore, the probability that the code has a list size greater than L is at most 2− log(pn3) = 1
pn3
.
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Since t < n and tpˆt < n, the probability that the code C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ Ck is L-list decodable for any k = tnθ
is at least
1− n · n · 1
pn3
= 1− 1
pn
In addition, since t (1−H(pˆt)) − n2 ≥ nR, from (45) we have 1 −H(pˆt) − nRt − nStθ ≥ n2t − nθ
2
8t >

4 . For
large enough n, we have log(pn
3)
t = O
(
logn
n
)
. Thus, we obtain
L <
1 +O
(
logn
n
)

4
= O
(
1

)
A.5 Utilizing the energy bounding condition
Unless otherwise specified, for any integer t ∈ T where T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ}, integer k = tnθ is the
number of chunks of a left mega sub-code (or sub-codeword) with respect to position t and l = 1θ − tnθ is
the number of chunks of a right mega sub-code (or sub-codeword) with respect to position t.
Definition A.17. A right mega sub-codeword Ck+1 (m, sk+1)◦Ck+2 (m, sk+2)◦· · ·◦C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
is of distance
d from a set of right mega sub-codewords if the Hamming distance between the right mega sub-codeword
Ck+1 (m, sk+1) ◦ Ck+2 (m, sk+2) ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
and any right mega sub-codeword in the given set is at
least d.
In what follows we will define properties of our code with respect to a list of right mega sub-codewords L(m).
This list consists of all the right mega sub-codewords corresponding to the L messages in L obtained by
Bob in the list decoding phase of his decoding, excluding the true message m Alice wishes to communicate
to Bob, if it is indeed in the list L (it may not be, if pt > pˆt for the t under consideration). Hence the size
L(m) of L(m) is at most 2nSl · L (if the true message m /∈ L), and is at most 2nSl · (L − 1) (if the true
message m ∈ L).
Definition A.18. A right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is good with respect to a list L(m) of right
mega sub-codewords, a message m and a sequence of l = 1θ − tnθ secrets
(
sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1
θ
)
if the right
mega sub-codeword Ck+1 (m, sk+1) ◦ Ck+2 (m, sk+2) ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
is of distance more than n−t2 − (n−t)
2
8
from the list L(m).
Definition A.19. A right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦C 1
θ
is σ-good with respect to a list L(m) of right
mega sub-codewords and a message m if the right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is good with respect
to the message m, the list L(m) and a (1− σ) portion of sequences of l = 1θ − tnθ secrets in the set S l.
Claim A.20. Given a sequence of l = 1θ − tnθ secrets (sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1θ ) ∈ S
l, with probability larger than
1−2−δ(n−t) over code design, a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦Ck+2 ◦ · · ·◦C 1
θ
is good with respect to the message
m, the list L(m) and the sequence (sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1
θ
) of secrets, where δ = θ
2
4 and S =
θ3
8 .
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Proof. Let
{
x1,x2, · · · ,xL(m)
}
be the list of right mega sub-codewords L(m). Note that L(m) = 2nSl ·
O
(
1

)
. Define the forbidden region with respect to the list L(m) as
FL(m) =
L⋃
i=1
B (xi, r)
where B (xi, r) is the Hamming ball with center xi and radius r =
n−t
2 − (n−t)
2
8 . We depict the notion of
the forbidden region in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Three realizations of forbidden regions: In each realization, shaded disks correspond to the
forbidden region and the isolated red point is a right mega sub-codeword outside the forbidden region.
Since the size of the list L(m) is L(m), the number of words of length n− t in the forbidden region FL(m)
can be determined to be
L(m)
r∑
i=0
(
n− t
i
)
< L(m)2
(n−t)H
(
1
2
− 2
8
)
(48)
= 2
(n−t)
(
logL(m)
n−t +H
(
1
2
− θ
2(1−4p′)
))
< 2
(n−t)
(
logL(m)
n−t +H(
1
2
− θ
2)
)
< 2
(n−t)
(
logL(m)
n−t +
(
1− θ2
2 ln 2
))
(49)
where (48) follows by the upper bound on the volume of a Hamming ball, (49) follows from the Taylor
series of the binary entropy function in a neighborhood of 12 , i.e., H(p) = 1− 12 ln 2
∞∑
i=1
(1−2p)2i
(2i−1)i .
We assume that L(m) = 2nSl ·O (1 ). Since t ∈ T , we have t ≤ n−nθ. Then by choosing n to be sufficiently
large and S = θ
3
8 , we have for some constant c that
θ2
2 ln 2
− logL(m)
n− t =
θ2
2 ln 2
− log(c/)
n− t −
S
θ
>
θ2
4
.
Thus, we can choose δ = θ
2
4 and obtain δ <
θ2
2 ln 2 − logL(m)n−t . It follows that
logL(m)
n− t +
(
1− θ
2
2 ln 2
)
≤ 1− δ (50)
Substituting (50) into (49), we have
L(m)
r∑
i=0
(
n− t
i
)
< 2(n−t)(1−δ) (51)
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Let Ck+1 (m, sk+1) ◦ Ck+2 (m, sk+2) ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
be a right mega sub-codeword corresponding to m. If
the right mega sub-codeword Ck+1 (m, sk+1) ◦ Ck+2 (m, sk+2) ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
is not in the region FL(m),
then by Definition A.18, the code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is good with respect to m, the list L(m) and the
secrets (sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1
θ
).
Therefore, the probability over Ck+1◦Ck+2◦· · ·◦C 1
θ
that mega sub-codeword Ck+1 (m, sk+1)◦Ck+2 (m, sk+2)◦
· · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
does not lie in the forbidden region FL(m) is
P
[
Ck+1 (m, sk+1) ◦ Ck+2 (m, sk+2) ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
/∈ FL(m)
]
>
2n−t − 2(n−t)(1−δ)
2n−t
= 1− 2−(n−t)δ (52)
Claim A.21. With probability larger than 1− 2−n2 over code design, a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦
· · · ◦ C 1
θ
of length l = 1θ − tnθ is σ-good with respect to m and the list L(m), where σ = 2−
nS
4 and S = θ
3
8 .
Proof. Let S = [2Sn] be the set of integers between 0 and 2Sn − 1. We start by considering a partition
of the set of right mega sub-codewords corresponding to m into S l−1 disjoint subsets. Specifically, we
partition the set of secrets S l into S l−1 disjoint sets. Each set is indexed by an element (sk+2, . . . , s 1
θ
) in
S l−1. The set Ss∗ corresponding to s∗ = (s∗k+2, . . . , s∗1
θ
) equals:
Ss∗ = {s = (a, s∗k+2 + a, . . . , s∗1
θ
+ a) | a ∈ [2Sn]}
where addition is done modulo 2Sn. It holds that
S l =
⋃
s∗∈Sl−1
Ss∗ .
Let s∗ ∈ S l−1. In our analysis below we use the fact that any two l-tuples s = (sk+1, sk+2, . . . , s 1
θ
) and
s′ = (s′k+1, s
′
k+2, . . . , s
′
1
θ
) in S l that appear in Ss∗ have the property that all their coordinates differ. Namely
that sk+1 6= s′k+1, . . . , s 1
θ
6= s′1
θ
.
Now consider the set of 2Sn right mega sub-codewords Ck+1 (m, sk+1) ◦ Ck+2 (m, sk+2) ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
corresponding to l-tuples s = (sk+1, sk+2, . . . , s 1
θ
) from a certain set Ss∗ in the partition specified above.
Each such mega sub-codeword consists of l chunks. By our construction, the set of l · 2Sn chunks of the
right mega sub-codewords corresponding to s = (sk+1, sk+2, . . . , s 1
θ
) ∈ Ss∗ are independent and uniformly
distributed. This follows directly from our code construction and the property of Ss∗ discussed above.
Thus, for s = (sk+1, sk+2, . . . , s 1
θ
) and s′ = (s′k+1, s
′
k+2, . . . , s
′
1
θ
) in Ss∗ , the event that a right mega sub-
code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not good with respect to m, the list L(m) and the secrets (sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1
θ
)
is independent from the event that a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not good with respect
to m, the list L(m) and the secrets (s′k+1, s′k+2, · · · , s′1
θ
).
From Claim A.20, a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not good with respect to m, the list L(m)
and a sequence of secrets (sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1
θ
) with probability less than 2−(n−t)δ. Thus, the probability
27
that a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not good with respect to m, the list L(m) and a certain
σ portion of sequences of l secrets in the set Ss∗ is less than(
2−(n−t)δ
)σ2nS
= 2−(n−t)δσ2
nS
.
The number of all possible σ-portion of the set Ss∗ is(
2nS
σ2nS
)
< 22
nSH(σ).
We say that a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is σ-good with respect to a list L(m) of right mega
sub-codewords, a message m and a secret set Ss∗ if the right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is good
with respect to the message m, the list L(m) and a (1− σ) portion of sequences of secrets in the set Ss∗ .
Therefore, the probability over code design that a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not σ-good
with respect to m, list L(m), and Ss∗ is
P
[
Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not σ-good w.r.t. m,L(m),Ss∗
]
≤ 2−(n−t)δσ2nS22nSH(σ)
≤ 2−nθδσ2nS22nSH(σ) (53)
= 22
nS(−nθδσ+H(σ))
< 22
nS(−nθδσ−2σ log σ) (54)
= 22
3nS
4 (−θ3+2S)n4 (55)
= 22
3nθ3
32 (− 34)nθ
3
4 (56)
< 2−n
3
(57)
where (53) follows by n− t ≥ nθ, (54) follows by Lemma A.5, (55) follows by substituting σ = 2−nS4 and
δ = θ
2
4 , (56) follows by substituting S =
θ3
8 , and (57) follows for sufficiently large n.
Now union bounding over all sets Ss∗ in the partition of S l, we get for sufficiently large n that
P
[
∃s∗ : Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not σ-good w.r.t. m,L(m),Ss∗
]
≤ 2−n32Sn(l−1) < 2−n2 (58)
Finally, we notice that being σ-good with respect to a list L(m) of right mega sub-codewords, a message m
and any secret set Ss∗ in the partition of S l implies being σ-good with respect to m and list L(m). Hence,
the probability over code design that a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is σ-good with respect
to m and list L(m) is
P
[
Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is σ-good w.r.t.m,L(m)
]
> 1− 2−n2 . (59)
Remark A.22. The goodness of a right mega sub-code is what guarantees that the consistency check in
the decoding process succeeds. Specifically, if a code is good with respect to a certain list and a certain
message m; and in addition the right mega sub-codeword has few bit-flips; then if m is in the list it will
be (w.h.p.) the unique element that passes the consistency checking phase of Bob, and if it is not in the
list the consistency phase of Bob will not return any message (w.h.p.).
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Claim A.23. Let σ = 2−
nS
4 and S = θ
3
8 . With probability larger than 1− 2−n over code design, for every
message m, every list L(m), and every chunk end t ∈ T , the right mega sub-code is σ-good with respect to
m and L(m).
Proof. The number of possible lists that can be obtained at a certain left mega chunk end t depends on a
set of messages of size is c for some constant c and is thus at most of size(
2Rn
c

)
≤ 2Rcn/ (60)
From Claim A.21 we know that for σ = 2−
nS
4 and S = θ
3
8 , the probability that a right mega sub-code
Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is σ-good with respect to all m, any list L(m), and every left mega chunk end t is at
least
1− 2nR · 2Rcn/ · 1
θ
· 2−n2 > 1− 2−n2+3cn/
> 1− 2−n (61)
for sufficiently large n.
A.6 Summary and proof Theorem 1.1
Claim A.24. Let p′ ∈ (0, 14) and  > 0. Let θ = 2(1−4p′)4 and pˆt = n2216 · 1t2 − n(1−4p′)4 · 1t + 14 . Let p = p′− 216
be the fraction of a codeword Calvin flips. With probability at least 1 − 1pn − 2−n over code design, there
exists a good code C such that the following properties are satisfied
• For any bit-flip pattern of the adversary, there exists a position t? = k?nθ such that the left mega
sub-code with respect to position t?, C1 ◦C2 ◦· · ·◦Ck?, is list decodable with list size L = O
(
1

)
and that
the transmitted message m is in L. Let L(m) be the list of right mega sub-codewords corresponding
to L \ {m}.
• For any position t for which t0 ≤ t ≤ t?, the right mega sub-word received with respect to position t has
no more than 14 − 
2
16 of its bits flipped; and, in addition, the right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1θ
is σ-good with respect to the message m transmitted and the list L(m) where σ = 2−nS4 and S = θ38 .
Proof. We consider all possible bit-flip patterns of the adversary by analyzing all of Calvin’s possible
trajectories. As mentioned above, all possible trajectories of Calvin can be classified into two types, the
High Type trajectory and the Low Type Trajectory.
For any Low Type Trajectory, we have pt0 < p˜t0 < pˆt0 . Notice that by our choice of pˆt, the list-decoding
condition in Claim A.6 is always satisfied. Therefore, with list decoding radius t0pˆt0 , by Corollary A.16,
the left mega sub-code C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ C t0
nθ
is list decodable with list size O
(
1

)
with probability 1− 1pn over
code design. In addition, since t0pt0 < t0pˆt0 , we have m ∈ L. So far the first property is satisfied for any
Low Type Trajectory.
On the other hand, for any p = p′− 216 , by Claim A.14 the right mega sub-word with respect to position t0 has
no more than 14− 
2
16 of its bits flipped. Then by Claim A.23, the right mega sub-code C t0
nθ
+1
◦C t0
nθ
+2
◦· · ·◦C 1
θ
is σ-good with respect to m and list L(m) with probability 1− 2−n over code design. Hence, for any Low
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Figure 7: Case 1: Stop decoding at t? = t0 under the setting where n = 40000, p
′ = 18 ,  = 0.08 and
t ∈ [20000, 40000].
Type Trajectory, our code design possesses the two properties stated in the claim. Moreover, in this case
we have t? = t0 (Shown in Figure 7).
For any High Type Trajectory, we have pt0 > p˜t0 . By Claim A.8, given any trajectory pt of High Type,
the trajectory pt always intersects with pˆt no later than the second to last chunk end. Let t
? be the chunk
end immediately after the first intersection point (Shown in Figure 8). Then at any position t ≤ t?, by
Corollary A.16 with list decoding radius tpˆt, the left mega sub-code C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ C t
nθ
is list decodable with
list size O
(
1

)
with probability 1 − 1pn over code design. Also, for t?, since t?pt? < t?pˆt? , the transmitted
message m is in the list L.
From Claim A.11 and Claim A.12, for any trajectory pt of Calvin of High Type, if t ≤ t? then the right
mega sub-word with respect to position t has no more than 14 − 
2
16 of its bits flipped. Furthermore, the
right mega sub-code with respect to position t, C t
nθ
+1 ◦ C t
nθ
+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
, is σ-good with respect to m and
list L(m) with probability 1 − 2−n over code design. Thus far, for any High Type Trajectory, both the
properties in the claim are also satisfied by our code design.
In conclusion, the probability that the code C possesses the two properties is at least 1− 1pn − 2−n.
Remark A.25. Note that, using the code from Claim A.24, the position t? can found by Bob through an
iterative decoding process starting from the position t0, and therefore, the coding process of Bob can stop
at t? correctly. More precisely, Claim A.24 ensures that every time Bob obtains a list of codewords, then no
matter if the transmitted message m is in the list L or not, the right mega sub-code with respect to position
t ≤ t? is σ-good with respect to m and the right mega sub-codeword list L(m). In other words, if t is
strictly smaller than t? then the consistency decoding of Bob will not return any message, and when t = t?
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the consistency decoding will return the correct message (all with high probability over the randomness of
Alice). Thus, Bob can correctly determine whether to continue the decoding process or not.
Claim A.26. Let p′ ∈ (0, 14) and  > 0. Let θ = 2(1−4p′)4 and pˆt = n2216 · 1t2−n(1−4p′)4 · 1t+ 14 . Let p = p′− 216 be
the fraction of a codeword Calvin flips. Let R = Cp′− where Cp′ = minp¯∈[0,p′]
[
α (p′, p¯)
(
1−H
(
p¯
α(p′,p¯)
))]
and α (p′, p¯) = 1−4(p′−p¯). For any message m ∈ [2nR] and its corresponding encoding x ∈ {0, 1}n using the
code established in Claim A.24 and the encoder of Section 2, the decoding procedures described in Section 2
allows Bob to correctly decode the message m with probability at least 1− n2−nθ
3
32 over the random secrets
s ∈ S available to Alice.
Proof. A decoding error occurs if in Step (3) of the decoding procedure the consistency decoder fails to
return a single message or if the decoder returns a message that is not equal to the transmitted message.
For all t strictly less than t? of Claim A.24, we have by property (2) of Claim A.24, Remark A.25, and
by the definition of Step (3) of our decoding procedure that the consistency check in the decoding process
will not return any message (with probability 1 − σ over the randomness of the encoding). In addition,
for t = t?, with the same probability, the consistency check of the decoding process will return the correct
message. In both cases, the success probability is obtained by the probability that the sequence of l secrets
used in the right mega sub-codeword is not chosen from the particular σ portion of S l that may cause a
decoding failure. From Claim A.23, we have σ = 2−
nS
4 where S = θ
3
8 .
Therefore, the probability of successful decoding is at least
1− nσ = 1− n2−nS4 = 1− n2−nθ
3
32 .
31
Theorem A.27 (Rephrasing of Theorem 1.1). Let p′ ∈ (0, 14),  > 0 and p = p′ − 216 . The capacity of
the binary causal adversary bit-flip channel Cp is minp¯∈[0,p]
[
α (p, p¯)
(
1−H
(
p¯
α(p,p¯)
))]
where α (p, p¯) =
1− 4(p− p¯).
Proof. Let ξ > 0 and β > 0. The converse is proven in [12]. Namely, in [12] it is shown that for any code
C with stochastic encoding of rate R = Cp + β, the average error probability is lower bounded by βO
(
1
β
)
.
The achievability proof (our main result) follows from the claim above. Specifically, for sufficiently large
n it holds by Claim A.26 that the decoding error is bounded by above by ξ. In addition, for sufficiently
small , by the definition of p′ and by the continuity of the entropy function, the code rate R = Cp′ −  of
Claim A.26 is at least Cp − β. Therefore, for sufficiently large n, 2nR = 2n(Cp−β) distinct messages can be
reliably transmitted over our channel with error probability at most ξ. Hence, the channel capacity of the
binary causal adversarial bit-flip channel is Cp.
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Table 1: Table of Parameters (for the bit-flip case)
symbol description equality/range
m message m ∈ U
s secret s ∈ S
x codeword x ∈ X n
U message set U = [2nR]
S secret set S = [2nS]
X input alphabet {0, 1}
Y output alphabet {0, 1}
T set of chunk ends {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ}
C code (3)
Φ uniform distribution of stochastic codes
Cp capacity minp¯∈[0,p]
[
α (p, p¯)
(
1−H
(
p¯
α(p,p¯)
))]
R message rate R = Cp′ − 
S secret rate S = θ
3
8
 gap in the rate from Cp
θ 1θ is the number of chunks in a codeword θ =
2(1−4p′)
4
p′ assumed fraction of a codeword that can be flipped p′ = p+ 
2
16
p actual fraction of a codeword that can be flipped p ∈ (0, 14)
pt Calvin’s trajectory Definition 2.5
p¯t for deriving pˆt (4)
pˆt decoding reference trajectory (5)
p˜t energy bounding benchmarking trajectory (24)
n block length
k number of chunks in the left mega sub-codeword k = tnθ
l number of chunks in the right mega sub-codeword l = 1θ − tnθ
t length of left mega sub-codeword t ∈ T
t? correct decoding point Definition 3.3
L a list of messages
L(m) a list of right mega sub-codewords
excluding codewords corresponding to m
L list size of L O (1 )
L(m) list size of L(m) 2nSl ·O (1 )
σ fraction of bad secret sequences in S l σ = 2−nS4
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B Code Analysis for the Erasure Channel
In this section we address the bit erasure case. For completeness, we repeat parts of the model.
B.1 Model
Channel Model: For any positive integer i, let [i] denote the set {1, 2, · · · , i}. For a transmission
duration of n bits, a binary causal adversarial erasure channel can be characterized by a parameter p ∈ [0, 1]
and a triple (X n,Adv,Yn). Here, p is the fraction of bits that Calvin can erase in a codeword, X = {0, 1}
and Y = {0, 1,Λ} is the input and output alphabet of the channel, and Adv = {Advi|i ∈ [n]} is a sequence
of mappings such that by the end of transmitting n bits, the number of erasures in the codeword is at
most np. More precisely, each map Advi : X i × Y i−1 → Y is a (randomized) function that, at the time of
transmitting the i-th bit, maps the sequence of channel inputs up to time i, (x1, x2, · · · , xi) ∈ X i, together
with the sequence of all previous channel outputs up to time i− 1, (y1, y2, · · · , yi−1) ∈ Y i−1, to an output
symbol yi ∈ {xi,Λ}. The functions Advi must satisfy the adversarial power constraint, namely that at no
point in time does the total number of bit-flips exceed pn.
Random Code Distribution: Follows the bit-flip case.
Encoder: Follows the bit-flip case.
Decoding Process: The decoding process of Bob is divided into two phases. Firstly, upon receiving
the entire codeword with erasures, Bob identifies the smallest integer value of k? such that the number of
erasures λ in the first k? chunks of the received word satisfy: t? ≥ Rn+λ+θt? and np−λ+ (n−t?)θ2 ≤ n−t
?
2 ,
where t? = k?nθ is the number of bits in the first k? chunks. In our proof to come, we show that indeed
such a k? exists. Then Bob decodes the left mega sub-codeword C1 (m, s1) ◦ C2 (m, s2) ◦ · · · ◦ Ck? (m, sk?)
for λ erasures by using a list decoder (of messages) with list size L. As we will show, the list size L is at
most O
(
1

)
. At this phase, the list decoded by Bob includes L messages, one of which corresponds to the
transmitted message m. Let L denote the set of L messages in the decoded list.
In the second phase of decoding, Bob now considers the right mega sub-codeword Ck?+1 (m, sk?+1) ◦
Ck?+2 (m, sk?+2) ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
and uses the natural consistency decoder (defined below) to decode
a message mˆ ∈ L. As we will show, the right mega sub-codeword with respect to position t? = k?nθ has
at most a fraction of
(
1
2 − θ2
)
of its entries erased.
Definition B.1. Let k ∈ [1θ − 1]. Let x ∈ X knθ be a mega sub-codeword and x′ ∈ {0, 1,Λ}knθ be a mega
sub-codeword with erasures, where Λ denotes erasure. The mega sub-codeword x is consistent with the
erased mega sub-codeword x′ if and only if x agrees with x′ in every unerased position.
Definition B.2. A consistency decoder applied to a right mega sub-code C t
nθ
+1◦C t
nθ
+2◦· · ·◦C 1
θ
with respect
to position t is a decoder that takes the right mega sub-codeword of a received codeword x′ and returns a
unique message mˆ corresponding to a message in the list L, at least one of whose right mega sub-codewords
is consistent with that of x′. If more than one such message exists, then a decoding error is declared.
Formally, the decoder process of Bob can be described as follows:
• Identify an integer k? with t? = k?nθ such that t? ≥ Rn+ λ+ θt? and np− λ+ (n−t?)θ2 ≤ n−t
?
2
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• List decode the left mega sub-code C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ Ck? with respect to position t? to obtain a list L of
messages of size L, with list decoding radius λ.
• Verify the right mega sub-codewords of the messages in the list L through a consistency decoder to
recover a message mˆ which is in L or declare a decoding error.
Bob will decode correctly if his estimate mˆ is equal to m. As m is in L, correct decoding will happen if the
only right mega sub-codewords with respect to position t? consistent with that of the received codeword
correspond to the message m. In our analysis, we will show that this indeed happens with high probability
over the random secrets used by Alice for encoding the right mega sub-codeword.
If Bob’s estimate mˆ is not equal to m, Bob is said to make a decoding error. The probability of error for
a message m is defined as the probability over Alice’s private secrets that Bob decodes incorrectly. The
probability of error for the code C is defined as the maximum over all messages m ∈ U of the probability
of error for message m.
A rate R is said to be achievable if for every ξ > 0, β > 0 and every sufficiently large n that there
exists a code of block length n that allows Alice to communicate 2n(R−β) distinct messages with Bob with
probability of error at most ξ. The supremum over n of all achievable rates is the capacity of the channel,
denoted by Cp.
Adversarial Behavior: The behavior of Calvin is specified by the channel model above. Nevertheless,
in our analysis we assume that Calvin has certain capabilities that may be beyond those available to a
causal adversary. This can be done without loss of generality as we are studying lower bounds on the
achievable rate in this work, and thus our bounds will also hold for the original (more restricted) causal
adversary Calvin.
To be more specific, in our analysis, we model the behavior of Calvin in two phases corresponding to
the phases of Bob. In the first phase, Calvin behaves causally and erases certain bits of the transmitted
codeword. At some point in time, no matter which bits Calvin decides to erase, we show (by Claim B.3
and Claim B.6) that there will be an integer t? for which two properties hold:
• For any erasure pattern of the adversary, there exists a position t? such that the left mega sub-code
with respect to t?, C1 (m, s1) ◦ C2 (m, s2) ◦ · · · ◦ Ck? (m, sk?) is list-decodable with list size L = O
(
1

)
,
and that the transmitted message m ∈ L.
• At position t?, the right mega sub-word received with respect to position t? has no more than 12 − θ2
of its bits erased.
We will assume throughout our analysis that the value t? that Bob uses in his decoding and the list L of
messages obtained through Bob’s list decoding process can be determined explicitly by Calvin. Moreover,
we assume that Calvin knows the message m all along.
The second phase of Calvin starts after t? bits have been transmitted. At this point in time we show
in Claim B.3 that no matter how Calvin behaves there will be at most
(
1
2 − θ2
)
(n− t?) bits that can be
erased. We stress that in the beginning of Calvin’s second phase, the secrets corresponding to the right
mega sub-codeword are unknown to Calvin. Indeed, given the causal nature of Alice’s encoding, the secrets
have not even been chosen by Alice at this point in time. The fact that those secrets are hidden from
Calvin imply that the secrets of the right mega sub-codeword are completely independent of the list L
determined by Calvin. This fact is crucial to our analysis.
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In the second phase, we strengthen Calvin by allowing him to choose which bits to erase in a non-causal
manner. Namely, we assume that Calvin chooses his erasure pattern after seeing (or looking ahead at) all
the remaining bits of the transmitted codeword. As mentioned above, no matter how these erasures are
chosen, there will be at most
(
1
2 − θ2
)
(n− t?) erased bits. The fact that the distribution of the secrets is
independent from the list L will allow us to show that Bob succeeds in his decoding.
B.2 Code Analysis for the Erasure Channel
We start by summarizing several definitions and claims. The detailed presentations of the definitions and
claims are followed by the summary.
1. The list decoding and energy bounding properties and the existence of a correct decod-
ing point
• Claim B.3: This is a central claim which establish the existence of the correct decoding point t?
such that, no matter what the erasure pattern chosen by Calvin is, the list-decoding condition
and the energy bounding condition are satisfied.
2. List decoding properties
• Claim B.6: A left mega sub-code can be list decoded to a list of message of size O (1 ) with high
probability.
• Corollary B.7: Every left mega sub-code can be list decoded to a list of message of size O (1 )
with high probability.
3. Utilizing the energy bounding condition
• Definition B.8: Defines the distance between a right mega sub-codeword and a list of codewords.
• Definition B.9: Defines certain goodness property of a right mega sub-code with respect to a
message, a list of right mega sub-codewords (of messages excluding the transmitted message),
and a sequence of secrets.
• Definition B.9: Defines the σ-goodness property of a right mega sub-code with respect to a
message and a list of right mega sub-codewords (of messages excluding the transmitted message).
• Claim B.11: A right mega sub-code is good with respect to a message, a list of right mega
sub-codewords (of messages excluding the transmitted message), and a sequence of secrets.
• Claim B.12: A right mega sub-code is σ-good with respect to a message and a list of right mega
sub-codewords (of messages excluding the transmitted message).
• Claim B.14: A right mega sub-code is σ-good with respect to every transmitted message and
every list of right mega sub-codewords (of messages excluding the transmitted message).
4. Summary and proof of Theorem 1.2
• Claim B.15: With high probability our code C possesses the needed properties.
• Claim B.16: With high probability Bob succeeds in decoding.
• Theorem B.17: Rephrasing of Theorem 1.2 (channel capacity).
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We now define several properties for our code C defined in Section B.1 that once established will allow
communication between Alice and Bob. The properties defined are governed by the discussion given
in Section B.1. Throughout, for a list L of messages, we denote the list of right mega sub-codewords
corresponding to L which exclude the right mega sub-codewords corresponding to a specific message m as
L(m).
B.2.1 The list decoding and energy bounding properties and the existence of correct de-
coding point
Claim B.3. For any erasure pattern chosen by the adversary, let R = 1 − 2p −  for  ∈ (0, 1− 2p) and
p ∈ [0, 12). Let a codeword of length n consists of 1θ chunks of sub-codewords and 4θ = . Let λ be the
number of erasures up to position t? where λ ≤ np. Let T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ} and t? ∈ T . Then there
exists t? = k?nθ such that
Rn+ λ+ θt? ≤ t? (62)
and that
np− λ+ (n− t
?)θ
2
≤ n− t
?
2
(63)
Proof. First we note that (1− 2p− + θ − θ2)n+ λ ≤ n− nθ. This holds for
−θ2 + 2θ −  ≤ 2p− λ
n
(64)
where the right hand side(RHS) is positive as 2p > λn and  = 4θ.
Next let t? be any value in the set T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ} such that
t? ≥ (1− 2p− + θ − θ2)n+ λ (65)
That is to say, t? is in the range
[
(1− 2p− + θ − θ2)n+ λ, n− nθ]. It follows that k? is in the range[
(1−2p−+θ−θ2)n+λ
nθ ,
1−θ
θ
]
. Notice that by our setting of parameters, such an t? exists. Namely, as 4θ = 
we have
(n− nθ)− (1− 2p− + θ − θ2)n− λ > nθ
Since t? ∈ [(1− 2p− + θ − θ2)n+ λ, n− nθ], we have
Rn+ λ+ θt? ≤ Rn+ λ+ θ(n− nθ)
= (1− 2p− + θ − θ2)n+ λ
≤ t?
Thus far, we have satisfied Condition (62) in our claim. Next we will that t? also satisfies Condition (63).
Actually, it is equivalent to showing that
t? ≤ n− np− λ
1
2 − θ2
=
(
1− p
1
2 − θ2
)
n+
λ
1
2 − θ2
(66)
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or in terms of k? we need to show
k? ≤ 1
θ
− np− λ(
1
2 − θ2
)
nθ
(67)
Note that to satisfy Condition (62) we need t? to be between (1− 2p− + θ− θ2)n+ λ and n−nθ for any
θ > 0. Here, in addition, we also require t? to be smaller than
(
1− p1
2
− θ
2
)
n + λ1
2
− θ
2
. Hence, it suffices to
show that (
1− p
1
2 − θ2
)
n+
λ
1
2 − θ2
− (1− 2p− + θ − θ2)n− λ ≥ nθ (68)
Since the left hand side(LHS) of (68) can be viewed as a linear function of λ, we minimize the LHS of (68)
over λ and get
LHS of (68) ≥
(
1− p
1
2 − θ2
)
n− (1− 2p− + θ − θ2)n
Now for the above to be at least nθ, we need
p ≤ 1
2
· (1− θ)
(
− 2θ + θ2)
θ
(69)
Notice that if
(1−θ)(−2θ+θ2)
θ > 1 then for any p ∈
[
0, 12
)
, (69) always holds and so does (68).
Now for a given  ≤ 1− 2p < 1 and 4θ = , we have
(1− θ) (− 2θ + θ2) ≥ 1
2
(
− 2θ + θ2)
=
1
2
(
2θ + θ2
)
> θ
Remark B.4. Note that if the rate R > 1 − 2p then there will not exist t? such that both conditions in
Claim B.3 are simultaneously satisfied.
B.2.2 List decoding properties
Lemma B.5. Let m ∈ U , k ∈ [1θ − 1] and (s1, s2, · · · , sk) ∈ Sk. Let x′ ∈ {0, 1,Λ}knθ be a codeword with
λ erasures and x ∈ X knθ be a codeword encoded by (3),
x = C1 (m, s1) ◦ C2 (m, s2) ◦ · · · ◦ Ck (m, sk)
Then the probability over C1, C2, · · · , Ck that x is consistent with x′ is
(
1
2
)knθ−k
.
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Proof. Consider the i-th chunk of x′, denoted by x′i. If there are no erasures imposed on x
′
i, then the
probability that x′i is consistent with the i-th chunk of x, sub-codeword xi, is
(
1
2
)nθ
.
Further, if there are no erasures on all k chucks of x′, then the probability that x is consistent with x′ can
be determined to be ((
1
2
)nθ)k
=
(
1
2
)knθ
since the codewords for all chunks are independent.
Now suppose that there are λ erasures in the codeword x′, then the number of codewords that are consistent
with each x′ is 2k. Thus, the probability that x is consistent with x′ is
2k
(
1
2
)knθ
=
(
1
2
)knθ−k
(70)
Claim B.6. Let ∆ > 0, 4θ = , and S = θ
3
8 . Provided that Rn + λ + θt
? < t? for t? = k?nθ and
k? ∈ [1θ − 1], with probability 1 − 2−∆ over code design, the code C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ Ck? is list-decodable for λ
erasures with list size
H
(
λ
t?
)
+O
(
log t?
t?
)
+ 1− λt? + ∆t?
1− λt? − nRt? − Sθ
Proof. The proof follows the same technique used in [18, Thm. 10.3].
A code C is L-list decodable for λ erasures if for any received word x with λ bits erased, there are at most
L messages with (at least) one corresponding codeword consistent with x.
The number of words of length t? with λ erasures is
(
t?
k
)
2t
?−λ. By Stirling’s approximation, we have
log
(
t?
λ
)
= t?H
(
λ
t?
)
+O(log t?). Then the number of words of length t? with λ erasures is at most
2
t?
(
H( λt? )+O
(
log t?
t?
)
+1− λ
t?
)
(71)
For a received word x ∈ {0, 1,Λ}k?nθ with λ erasures, by Lemma B.5, the probability that a codeword of
k? = t
?
nθ chunks is consistent with the received word x is(
1
2
)t?−λ
(72)
Each message m corresponds to 2k
?Sn = 2t
?S/θ codewords of length t?. Since the encoding of each message
is independent of other messages, the probability that there exist more than L messages with each message
having some corresponding codeword of length t? that is consistent with x is at most
(
2Rn
L+ 1
)
·
(
2t
?S/θ
)L+1 · (2−(t?−λ))(L+1) < 2(Rn+t?S/θ)(L+1)2−(t?−λ)(L+1) (73)
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Hence, the probability that any codeword received up to position t? has a list of size greater than L is at
most
2
t?
(
H( λt? )+O
(
log t?
t?
)
+1− λ
t?
)
· 2(Rn+t?S/θ)(L+1)2−(t?−λ)(L+1) (74)
To quantify (74) we study
t?
(
H
(
λ
t?
)
+O
(
log t?
t?
)
+ 1− λ
t?
)
+ (Rn+ t?S/θ)(L+ 1)− (t? − λ)(L+ 1) < −∆ (75)
where ∆ > 0. Dividing (75) by t?, we obtain
H
(
λ
t?
)
+O
(
log t?
t?
)
+
(
1− λ
t?
)
+
(nR+ t?S/θ)
t?
(L+ 1)−
(
1− λ
t?
)
(L+ 1) < −∆
t?
From Rn+ λ+ θt? ≤ t? and S = θ38 we have (1− λt? )− nRt? − Sθ > 0. Then we have (75) if and only if
L >
H
(
λ
t?
)
+O
(
log t?
t?
)
+ (1− λt? ) + ∆t?
(1− λt? )− nRt? − Sθ
− 1 (76)
Therefore, if L satisfies (76), then the code C1◦C2◦· · ·◦Ck? is L-list decodable with probability 1−2−∆.
Corollary B.7. Let ∆ = log
(
pn3
)
, 4θ = , and S = θ
3
8 . Then with probability at least 1 − 1n over code
design, for any λ, any t? ∈ {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ}, and k? = t?nθ such that Rn + λ + θt? ≤ t?, the code
C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ Ck? is L-list decodable for λ erasures with
L =
H
(
λ
t?
)
+O
(
log t?
t?
)
+ 1− λt? +
log(pn3)
t?
1− λt? − nRt? − Sθ
= O
(
1

)
(77)
Proof. By Claim B.6, with probability 1− 2− log(pn3) the code C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ Ck? is L-list decodable with list
size L being
H
(
λ
t?
)
+O
(
log t?
t?
)
+ 1− λt? +
log(pn3)
t?
1− λt? − nRt? − Sθ
Therefore, the probability that the code has a list with size greater than L is at most 2− log(pn
3) = 1
pn3
.
Since λ ≤ pn and t? < n, taking the union bound over λ and t?, the probability that the code C1◦C2◦· · ·◦Ck?
is L-list decodable for λ erasures is at least
1− pn · n · 1
pn3
= 1− 1
n
Since Rn + λ + θt? ≤ t? and S = θ38 , we have 1 − λt? − nRt? − Sθ ≥ θ2 . For large enough n, we have
log(pn3)
t? = O
(
logn
n
)
< 1. In addition, we have H
(
k
t?
) ≤ 1, O ( log t?t? ) < 1 and 1− λt? ≤ 1. Thus, we obtain
L <
4
1− λt? − nRt? − Sθ
<
8
θ
= O
(
1

)
By Claim B.3, no matter what erasure pattern Calvin imposes on the first k? chunks, the right mega
sub-codeword with respect to position t? = k?nθ always has at most
(
1
2 − θ2
)
(n− t?) bits that are erased.
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B.2.3 Utilizing the energy bounding condition
Unless otherwise specified, for any integer t ∈ T where T = {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ}, integer k = tnθ is the
number of chunks of a left mega sub-code (or sub-codeword) with respect to position t and l = 1θ − tnθ is
the number of chunks of a right mega sub-code (or sub-codeword) with respect to position t. Recall that,
for a list L, we denote the list of right mega sub-codewords corresponding to messages in L excluding a
certain message m as L(m) = {x1,x2, · · · ,xL−1}.
Definition B.8 (Repeating Definition A.17). A right mega sub-codeword Ck+1 (m, sk+1) ◦ Ck+2 (m, sk+2) ◦
· · ·◦C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
is of distance d from a set of right mega sub-codewords if the Hamming distance between the
right mega sub-codeword Ck+1 (m, sk+1)◦Ck+2 (m, sk+2)◦ · · · ◦C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
and any right mega sub-codeword
in the given set is at least d.
Definition B.9. A right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is good with respect to a message m, a list
L(m) of right mega sub-codewords, and a sequence of l = 1θ − tnθ secrets
(
sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1
θ
)
if the right
mega sub-codeword Ck+1 (m, sk+1) ◦ Ck+2 (m, sk+2) ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
is of distance more than n−t2 − (n−t)θ2
from the list L(m).
Definition B.10. A right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is σ-good with respect to a message m and
a list L(m) of right mega sub-codewords if the right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is good with respect
to the message m, the list L(m) and a (1− σ) portion of sequences of l = 1θ − tnθ secrets in the set S l.
Claim B.11. Given a sequence of l = 1θ − tnθ secrets (sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1θ ) ∈ S
l, with probability larger than
1−2−δ(n−t) over code design, a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦Ck+2 ◦ · · ·◦C 1
θ
is good with respect to the message
m, the list L(m), and the secret sequence (sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1
θ
), where δ = θ
2
4 and S =
θ3
8 .
Proof. Define the forbidden region with respect to the list L(m) as
FL(m) =
L−1⋃
i=1
B (xi, r)
where B (xi, r) is the Hamming ball with center xi and radius r =
n−t
2 − (n−t)θ2 . We depict the notion of
the forbidden region in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Three realizations of forbidden regions: In each realization, shaded disks correspond to the
forbidden region and the isolated red point is a right mega sub-codeword outside the forbidden region.
41
Since the size of the list L(m) is (L− 1) · 2(n−t)Sθ , the number of codewords in FL(m) can be determined to
be
(L− 1) (2nS)l r∑
i=0
(
n− t
i
)
< L2(n−t)
S
θ 2(n−t)H(
1
2
− θ
2) (78)
= 2(n−t)(
logL
n−t +
S
θ
+H( 12− θ2))
< 2
(n−t)
(
logL
n−t +
S
θ
+
(
1− θ2
2 ln 2
))
(79)
where (78) follows by the upper bound on the volume of a Hamming ball, (79) follows from the Taylor
series of the binary entropy function in a neighborhood of 12 , i.e., H(p) = 1− 12 ln 2
∞∑
i=1
(1−2p)2i
(2i−1)i .
We assume that L = O
(
1

)
. Since t ∈ T , we have t ≤ n− nθ. Then by choosing n to be sufficiently large
and S = θ
3
8 , we have
θ2
2 ln 2 − logLn−t − Sθ > θ
2
4 . Thus, we can choose δ =
θ2
4 and obtain δ <
θ2
2 ln 2 − logLn−t − Sθ ,
and it follows that
logL
n− t +
S
θ
+
(
1− θ
2
2 ln 2
)
≤ 1− δ (80)
Substituting (80) into (79), we have
(L− 1) (2nS)l r∑
i=0
(
n− t
i
)
< 2(n−t)(1−δ) (81)
Let Ck+1 (m, sk+1) ◦ Ck+2 (m, sk+2) ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
be the right mega sub-codeword of a codeword x /∈
L(m). If the right mega sub-codeword Ck+1 (m, sk+1)◦Ck+2 (m, sk+2)◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
is not in the region
FL(m), then by Definition B.9, the code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is good with respect to the message m, the
list L(m) and the secrets (sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1
θ
).
Therefore, the probability over Ck+1◦Ck+2◦· · ·◦C 1
θ
that mega sub-codeword Ck+1 (m, sk+1)◦Ck+2 (m, sk+2)◦
· · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
does not lie in the forbidden region FL(m) is
P
[
Ck+1 (m, sk+1) ◦ Ck+2 (m, sk+2) ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
(
m, s 1
θ
)
/∈ FL(m)
]
>
2n−t − 2(n−t)(1−δ)
2n−t
= 1− 2−(n−t)δ.
Claim B.12. With probability larger than 1 − 2−n2 over code design, a right mega sub-code of length
l = 1θ − tnθ is σ-good with respect to a message m and the list L(m), where σ = 2−
nS
4 and S = θ
3
8 .
Proof. We begin by defining Ss∗ in exactly the same way as in the proof of Claim A.21. Then, by the same
reasoning as in Claim A.21, for s = (sk+1, sk+2, . . . , s 1
θ
) and s′ = (s′k+1, s
′
k+2, . . . , s
′
1
θ
) in Ss∗ , the event that
a right mega sub-code Ck+1◦Ck+2◦· · ·◦C 1
θ
is not good with respect to the message m, the list L(m) and the
secrets (sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1
θ
) is independent from the event that a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not good with respect to message m, the list L(m) and the secrets (s′k+1, s′k+2, · · · , s′1
θ
).
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From Claim B.11, a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not good with respect to m, the list L(m)
and a sequence of secrets (sk+1, sk+2, · · · , s 1
θ
) with probability less than 2−(n−t)δ. Thus, the probability
that Ck+1 ◦Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not good with respect to m, the list L(m) and a certain σ portion of sequences
of l secrets in the set Ss∗ is less than(
2−(n−t)δ
)σ(2nS)
= 2−(n−t)δσ2
nS
.
The number of all possible σ-portions of the set Ss∗ is(
2nS
σ2nS
)
< 22
nSH(σ).
We say that a right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is σ-good with respect to a list L(m) of right mega
sub-codewords, a message m and a secret set Ss∗ if the right mega sub-code Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is good
with respect to the message m, the list L(m) and a (1− σ) portion of sequences of secrets in the set Ss∗ .
Therefore, the probability over code design that Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not σ-good with respect to m, list
L(m), and Ss∗ is
P
[
Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not σ-good w.r.t. m,L(m),Ss∗
]
≤ 2−(n−t)δσ2nS22nSH(σ)
≤ 2−nθδσ2nS22nSH(σ) (82)
= 22
nS(−nθδσ+H(σ))
< 22
nS(−nθδσ−2σ log σ) (83)
= 22
3nS
4 (−θ3+2S)n4 (84)
= 22
3nθ3
32 (− 34)nθ
3
4 (85)
< 2−n
3
(86)
where (82) follows by n− t ≥ nθ, (83) follows by Lemma A.5, (84) follows by substituting σ = 2−nS4 and
δ = θ
2
4 , (85) follows by substituting S =
θ3
8 , and finally (86) follows for sufficiently large n.
Now union bounding over all sets Ss∗ in the partition of S l, we get for sufficiently large n that
P
[
∃s∗ : Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is not σ-good w.r.t. m,L(m),Ss∗
]
≤ 2−n32Sn(l−1) < 2−n2 (87)
Finally, we notice that being σ-good with respect to a list L(m) of right mega sub-codewords, a message m
and any secret set Ss∗ in the partition of S l implies being σ-good with respect to m and list L(m). Hence,
it follows that the probability over code design that Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is σ-good with respect to m and
list L(m) is
P
[
Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is σ-good w.r.t. m,L(m)
]
> 1− 2−n2 .
Remark B.13. The goodness of a right mega sub-code is what guarantees that the consistency check in the
decoding process succeeds. Specifically, if a code is good with respect to a certain list L(m) (corresponding
to L) and a certain message m; and in addition the right mega sub-codeword has few erased bits; then
if the message is in the message list L it will be (w.h.p.) the unique element that passes the consistency
checking phase of Bob.
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Claim B.14. Let σ = 2−
nS
4 and S = θ
3
8 . With probability larger than 1− 2−n over code design, for every
message m, every list L(m), and every chunk end t ∈ T , the right mega sub-code is σ-good with respect to
m and L(m).
Proof. The number of possible lists that can be obtained at a certain left mega chunk end t depends on a
set of messages of size is c for some constant c and is thus at most of size(
2Rn
c

)
≤ 2Rcn/ (88)
From Claim B.12 we know that for σ = 2−
nS
4 and S = θ
3
8 , the probability that a right mega sub-code
Ck+1 ◦ Ck+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is σ-good with respect to all m, every list L(m), and every left mega chunk end t is
at least
1− 2nR · 2Rcn/ · 1
θ
· 2−n2 > 1− 2−n2+3cn/
> 1− 2−n (89)
for sufficiently large n.
B.2.4 Summary and proof of Theorem 1.2
Claim B.15. Let p ∈ [0, 12),  ∈ (0, 1− 2p) and 4θ = . With probability at least 1 − 1n − 2−n over code
design, there exists a good code C that satisfies the following properties:
• For any erasure pattern of the adversary, there exists a position t? such that the left mega sub-code
with respect to t?, C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ Ck?, is list decodable with list size L = O
(
1

)
and that the transmitted
message m is in L. Let L(m) be the list of right mega sub-codewords corresponding to L \ {m}.
• At position t?, the right mega sub-word received with respect to position t? has no more than 12 − θ2 of
its bit erased; and in addition, the right mega sub-code Ck?+1 ◦ Ck?+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is σ-good with respect
to the message m and list L(m) where σ = 2−nS4 , and S = θ38 .
Proof. For any erasure pattern chosen by the adversary, by Corollary B.7, with probability at least 1− 1n
over code design, the left mega sub-code C1 ◦ C2 ◦ · · · ◦ Ck? is list decodable with decoding radius λ and list
size L = O
(
1

)
. Let λ be the parameter corresponding to t? of Claim B.3. Since we know there are exactly
λ erasures in the left mega sub-word of the received word, we have m ∈ L. In addition, the properties of
λ satisfy the number of asserted erasures in the right mega sub-word.
By Claim B.14, with probability greater than 1 − 2−n over code design, the right mega sub-code Ck?+1 ◦
Ck?+2 ◦ · · · ◦ C 1
θ
is σ-good with respect to m and list L(m).
Hence, the probability for the code C to simultaneously possess the two properties stated in the claim is
at least 1− 1n − 2−n.
Claim B.16. Let p ∈ [0, 12),  ∈ (0, 1− 2p) and 4θ = . Let R = 1− 2p− . For any transmitted message
m ∈ [2nR] the decoding procedures described in Section B.1 allows Bob to correctly decode with probability
at least 1− 2−nθ
3
32 over the random secrets s ∈ S available to Alice.
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Proof. A decoding error is declared if the consistency decoder fails to return a single message or if the
decoder returns a message that is not equal to the transmitted message. At position t?, by Claim B.15
and Remark B.13, the consistency check of the decoding process will return the correct message, with
probability 1 − σ over the randomness of the encoding. Therefore, the success probability is obtained
by the probability that the sequence of l? = 1θ − t
?
nθ secrets used in the right mega sub-codeword is not
chosen from the particular σ portion of S l? that may cause a decoding failure. From Claim B.12, we have
σ = 2−
nS
4 where S = θ
3
8 .
Hence, the probability of successful decoding is at least
1− σ = 1− 2−nS4 = 1− 2−nθ
3
32
Theorem B.17 (Rephrasing of Theorem 1.2). Let p ∈ [0, 12). The capacity of the binary causal adversarial
erasure channel Cp is 1− 2p.
Proof. Let ξ > 0 and β > 0 be arbitrarily small. The converse is proven in [8]. For achievability (our main
result), setting R to be equal to Cp − β and taking sufficiently large n, by Claim B.16 the probability of
decoding error is at most ξ. Therefore, Alice may reliably transmit 2n(1−2p−β) distinct messages to Bob
by using the code C while the probability of error of the code C is at most ξ. Hence, the capacity of the
channel is Cp = 1− 2p.
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Table 2: Table of Parameters (for erasure case)
symbol description equality/range
Λ erasure
m message m ∈ U
s secret s ∈ S
x codeword x ∈ X n
x′ codeword with erasures
U message set U = [2nR]
S secret set S = [2nS]
X input alphabet {0, 1}
Y output alphabet {0, 1,Λ}
T set of chunk ends {nθ, 2nθ, · · · , n− nθ}
C code (3)
Φ uniform distribution of stochastic codes
Cp capacity Cp = 1− 2p
R message rate R = Cp − 
S secret rate S = θ
3
8
 gap in the rate from Cp
θ 1θ is the number of chunks in a codeword θ =

4
p fraction of a codeword that can be erased p ∈ [0, 12)
n block length
k number of chunks in the left mega sub-codeword k = tnθ
l number of chunks in the right mega sub-codeword l = 1θ − tnθ
t length of left mega sub-codeword t ∈ T
t? correct decoding point lower (65), upper (66)
λ number of erasures up to the list decoding point
L a list of messages
L(m) a list of right mega sub-codewords
excluding codewords corresponding to m
L list size of L O (1 )
L(m) list size of L(m) 2nSl ·O (1 )
σ fraction of bad secret sequences in S l σ = 2−nS4
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